Suzanne Roderick v. Nathan Ricks, B. Ray Zoll, Douglas T. Castleton, Abaco Publishing, and Abaco Installers : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2000
Suzanne Roderick v. Nathan Ricks, B. Ray Zoll,
Douglas T. Castleton, Abaco Publishing, and Abaco
Installers : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven C. Tycksen; Zoll and Tycksen; attorneys for appellee.
John T. Anderson; Anderson and Karrenberg; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Roderick v. Ricks, No. 20000452.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/479
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE RODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
B. RAY ZOLL. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Defendant 
and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 20000452-SC 
(Priority No. 15) 
Appeal From a Final Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson (#0094) 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Appellant Douglas T. Castleton 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN 
Steven C. Tycksen 
580 East 9400 South, Suite B 
p Sijndy:, Utah 84070 
1
 Telephone: (801)572-2700 









NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
B. RAY ZOLL. 
Defendant, Crossclaim Defendant 
and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal No. 20000452-SC 
(Priority No. 15) 
Appeal From a Final Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson (#0094) 
50 West Broadway, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801)534-1700 
Attorneys for Appellant Douglas T. Castleton 
ZOLL & TYCKSEN 
Steven C. Tycksen 
580 East 9400 South, Suite B 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801)572-2700 
Attorneys for Appellee B. Ray Zoll 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in District Court 4 
C. Statement of Facts 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 13 
ARGUMENT 17 
A. ZOLL WAS CASTLETON'S LAWYER AT THE TIME ZOLL 
HELPED HIS OTHER CLIENT COLLECT A DEBT FROM, AND 
SEIZE THE PROPERTY OF, CASTLETON 17 
B. EVEN IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT ZOLL WAS NOT 
CASTLETON'S LAWYER AT THE TIME ZOLL WAS 
REPRESENTING RICKS, ZOLL WAS LEGALLY PRECLUDED 
FROM TAKING A POSITION ADVERSE TO CASTLETON AND 
FROM USING CASTLETON'S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
AGAINST HIM 25 
C. ZOLL BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY, 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND GOOD FAITH TO CASTLETON 29 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE 
UNDERLYING EVIDENCE FLATLY CONTRADICT ITS 
DETERMINATION THAT ZOLL WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE LOSS OF THE PROPERTY THAT ZOLL'S OTHER CLIENT 
SEIZED FROM CASTLETON 35 
CONCLUSION 39 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984) 3, 30, 36, 37 
Cardot v. Lauff. 262 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1980) 17 
Columbus Credit Co. v. Evans. 613 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio App. 1992) 17 
Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln - Mercury Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) 2 
D.D.Z. Molerwav Freiehtlines. Inc.. 880 P.2d 1 (Utah 1994) 38 
Dahl v. Gardner. 853 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Utah 1984) 38 
Fulton National Bank v. Tate. 363 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1966) 32,39 
Griffith v. Tavlor. 937 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1997) 25 
Hanlin v. Mitchelson. 794 F.2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1986) 17 
Houghton v. Dept. of Health. 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998) 1, 2, 24, 25, 26 
Hurst v. Southwest Mississippi Legal Services Corp.. 610 So.2d 374 (Miss. 1992) 18 
In re: Hansen. 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978) 30 
In re: Pullev. 182 Bankr. Rptr. 35 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995) 17 
In the Matter of Pages. 187N.W.2d227 (Mich. 1971) 18 
Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998) 1,2 
Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996) 29 
Loporto v. Hoegemann. 982 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1999) 18 
Lundberg v. Backman. 358 P.2d 987 (Utah 1961) 18,20 
Margulies bv Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985) 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33 
Mvers v. Mississippi State Bar. 480 S.2d 1080 (Miss. 1986) 18 
North Carolina State Bar v. Sheffield. 326 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. App. 1985) 22 
ii 
Polv Software Int'l. Inc. v. Yu Su. 880 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Utah 1995) 26 
SLC Ltd. v. Bradford Group West. Inc.. 999 F.2d 464 (10* Cir. 1993) 26 
Smoot v. Lund. 369 P.2d 933 (Utah 1962) 30 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141 (Utah App. 1994) 24 
Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984) 18 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 1,2 
Sweeney v. Happy Valley. Inc.. 417 P.2d 126 (Utah 1966) 30 
Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) 3, 31, 36, 37 
Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758 (Utah 1988) 3, 31, 36, 37 
Woodruff v. Tomlin. 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980) 25 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
ABA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 51:201 (1997) 26 
Annot., Malpractice & Liability of Attorney Representing Conflicting. Interests. 
28 A.L.R. 3d 389 (1969) 25 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 38 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877 38 
TREATISES 
7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law. §213 33 
iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from an initial judgment entitled "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order" (a copy of which is attached as App. A) and a subsequent final judgment entitled 
"Order Regarding Attorney's Fees" (a copy of which is attached as App. B) entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding. 
This Court is vested with jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented for review in this appeal are: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that appellee B. Ray Zoll ("Zoll") 
was not serving as legal counsel for appellant Douglas T. Castleton ("Castleton") at the time 
Zoll represented another client in the collection of a debt from Castleton. 
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both a clearly 
erroneous and correction of error standard. Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). 
However, because ". . .the Court has a special interest in administering the law governing 
attorney ethical rules, a trial court's discretion [under State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 
(Utah 1994)] is limited." Houghton v. Dent, of Health. 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998). This 
issue was preserved throughout the case, including Record on Appeal ("R.") 524-33, 1254-69, 
Trial Exhs. 1-14, and Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at R. 1983, pp. 2-137. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the matters at issue in Zoll's 
previous representation of Castleton were not substantially factually related to the matter on 
which Zoll represented a client adverse to Castleton. 
1 
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both a clearly 
erroneous and correction of error standard. Jeffs. 970 P.2d at 1244. However, because " . . . 
the Court has a special interest in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a trial 
court's discretion [under State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah 1994)] is limited." 
Houghton. 962 P.2d at 61. This issue was preserved throughout the case, including R. 1254-
69, Trial Exhs. 1-14, and Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 2-74, R. 1984, pp. 265-81. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll did not breach his fiduciary 
duties of loyalty, confidentiality and good faith to Castleton. 
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law reviewable under both a clearly 
erroneous and correction of error standard. Jeffs. 970 P.2d at 1244. However, because " . . . 
the Court has a special interest in administering the law governing attorney ethical rules, a trial 
court's discretion [under State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936-38 (Utah 1994)] is limited." 
Houghton. 962 P.2d at 61. This issue was preserved throughout the case including R. 524-33, 
1254-69, Trial Exhs. 1-14, and Tr. at R. 1983, pp.2-137. 
4. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll's misconduct was not the 
proximate cause of Castleton's claimed damages. 
This issue normally is a question of fact reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln - Mercurv Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996). In 
this case, however, the issue is a question of law reviewable under a correction of error 
standard given (a) the trial court's conclusion "as a matter of law" that Zoll's conduct " had 
nothing to do" with the loss of Castleton's property, and (b) the trial court's incorrect 
2 
subsidiary legal conclusion that Zoll did not breach his fiduciary duty to Castleton.1 This issue 
was preserved throughout this case, including R. 524-33, 1254-69, and 1660-66, Trial Exhs. 
25 and 26, and Tr. at R. 1985, pp. 612-15, 681-86. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules whose 
interpretation is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is a case about a lawyer who betrayed his client. While or soon after serving as 
Castleton's lawyer in three separate legal matters, Zoll decided to represent another client in 
the collection of a debt from Castleton-a debt which Zoll himself characterized as "really 
sensitive [and] ugly." (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 1 attached as App. C.) To help secure and collect 
the debt from Castleton, Zoll orchestrated his client's self-help seizure of tens of thousands of 
dollars of Castleton's personal property. Zoll then prepared and had Castleton sign an 
agreement acknowledging that the seizure of his property was "consensual." 
1
 In other words, when and if this Court reverses the trial court's conclusion that Zoll did not breach his 
fiduciary duty, it follows as a matter of law that Castleton, as the aggrieved subservient party in the fiduciary 
relationship, can set aside the entire tainted transaction in which Zoll orchestrated the seizure of Castleton's 
property. Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985); Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 
1984). Once the transaction is set aside, Castleton is entitled to either a restoration of the status quo as it existed 
just before Zoll facilitated the seizure, or an award of damages for the value of the property. This relief is not 
dependent upon an additional showing that Zoll's misconduct was the proximate cause of Castleton's loss. Under 
Utah law, once the breach of fiduciary duty is established, the aggrieved principal is entitled to relief. Wheeler 
bY and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988); Van Hake. 705 P.2d at 769; Baker. 684 P 2d 
at 636. 
3 
To challenge Zoll's role in the seizure, Castleton filed suit for breach of fiduciary duty, 
seeking actual damages for the value of his plundered property, punitive damages, and attorney 
fees. (R. 524-33.) One aspect of this claim was that Zoll's breach of fiduciary duty 
substantially assisted Zoll's other client in the unlawful confiscation of Castleton's property. 
(R. 1664; Tr. at R. 1983 at 6:15-20; R. 1985 at 1682-83.) 
B, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in District Court, 
Castleton's fiance, Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick"), filed her complaint in this case 
("Roderick Complaint") in July 1996. (R. 1-42.) The Roderick Complaint sought damages 
from Zoll and his client, Nathan Ricks ("Ricks"), for their conversion and destruction of 
personal property (collectively "Castleton Property") which had been in Castleton's possession 
(R. 1-42.) Castleton and two of his companies were named as defendants in the Roderick 
Complaint because they had failed to repay loans which were secured by the Castleton 
Property. (R. 1-10.) 
Castleton subsequently filed a cross-claim ("Castleton Cross-Claim") against Zoll and 
Ricks. (R. 524-33.)2 The Castleton Cross-Claim sought damages against Ricks for the fair 
market value of a portion of the Castleton Property and actual and punitive damages against 
Zoll for his breach of fiduciary duty.3 (R. 524-33.) 
2
 A copy of the Castleton Cross-Claim is attached as App. D. 
3
 After being served with the Castleton Cross-Claim, Zoll was less than cooperative during the discovery 
phase of the case. During the first several months of discovery, Zoll failed to respond to Castleton's discovery 
requests, prompting the filing of two separate motions to compel. (R. 673-80, 699-704.) The court subsequently 
entered an order compelling discovery. (R. 830-34.) After Zoll failed to comply with the discovery order, the 
court actually granted Castleton's motion for the entry of default judgment against Zoll. (R. 894-97.) Several 
months later, however, the court vacated the dismissal order on the condition that Zoll pay a portion of 
Castleton's attorney fees and that Zoll respond to the outstanding discovery. (R. 1193-96.) Shortly thereafter, 
Castleton again moved to compel discovery from Zoll. (R. 1330-35.) 
4 
Shortly before trial, Castleton settled his claims against Ricks. (R. 1651-55; Trial Exh. 
Q.) One of the settlement terms was that Castleton and Ricks agreed to "rescind, extinguish 
and void ab initio" the agreement which ZoU had prepared shortly after he facilitated Ricks' 
seizure of the Castleton Property — the agreement in which Castleton acknowledged that the 
seizure was "consensual." (Trial Exh. Q at p. 4 attached as App. E.) 
In September 1999, the court conducted a three-day bench trial on Castleton's breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against ZoU. Several weeks later, it issued a memorandum decision. (R. 
1692-1702.) The court concluded that although " . . . ZoU may have used very poor judgment 
in this matter," Finding No. 32 at R. 1760, ZoU "did not breach any duty of loyalty or 
confidentiality owed to Castleton" when ZoU facilitated the efforts of his other client, Ricks, to 
seize the Castleton Property. IcL 
Several months after the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order [of Dismissal], it formally denied Zollfs motion for attorney fees. (R. 1939-42.) Eight 
days later on May 10, 2000, Castleton filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 1947-49.) 
C. Statement of Facts/ 
1. Zoll is Castleton's Lawyer Until November 1996, 
ZoU served as Castleton's legal counsel in three separate legal matters over a three-year 
period. (Finding Nos. 1-3, R. 1753; Trial Exh. 14 attached as App. F.) These matters 
included a bankruptcy case in which Zoll represented Castleton for about thirteen months until 
May 1995, the defense of a collection action in which Zoll represented Castleton for about five 
4
 Because the trial court found that Castleton was not a credible witness, R. 1758, this statement of facts 
is based solely on the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial exhibits, and the deposition and 
trial testimony of Zoll. It is not based on Castleton's testimony. 
5 
months until June 1995, and a post-divorce case in which Zoll represented Castleton for 
nearly three years until November 1996.5 (Finding Nos. 1-3; Trial Exh. 14.) Zoll failed to 
prepare any written engagement agreements with Castleton even though he recognized "it's the 
better practice to do so" because it places the client on notice about his rights and obligations, 
generally, and the terms and conditions of withdrawal, specifically. (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 30:13-
14 and pp. 30, 31.) In connection with these three legal matters, Castleton entrusted Zoll with 
extensive personal financial information, including historical and current income, assets, and 
liabilities. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 35, 36, 152, 277; Trial Exh. 38 attached as App. G.) 
Zoll's representation of Castleton in his post-divorce case began in February 1994. 
(Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exh. 1.) Zoll filed several pleadings and papers and handled at 
least two court hearings for Castleton in the post-divorce case: In February 1994, Zoll 
defended Castleton in a contempt proceeding, and in October 1994, Zoll represented Castleton 
at a trial on his petition to modify the divorce decree. (R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-13.) In January 
1995, the lawyer for Castleton1 s former wife prepared and submitted a proposed Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce ("Proposed Order"). (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 48; Trial Exh. 8 
attached as App. H.) One month later, Zoll prepared and filed an objection ("Objection") to 
the Proposed Order. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 50-52; Trial Exh. 9 attached as App. I.) The 
divorce court scheduled a hearing on Zollfs Objection for May 1, 1995, but subsequently 
struck that hearing date.6 (Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 10, 11.) 
5
 The trial court did find that, as of April 1996, ". . . there was no attorney-client relationship between 
Zoll and Castleton." (Finding No. 25, R. 1758.) This is clearly erroneous, however, given Zoll's undeniable 
status as Castleton's counsel of record in the divorce case until Zoll's filed notice of withdrawal in November 
1996. (See Trial Exh. 14 attached as App. F, and Argument C, infra at pp. 29-34.) 
6
 The hearing on the Objection was eventually conducted in February 1997. (Trial Exh. 12 at p. 8.) 
6 
Zoll remained as Castleton's counsel of record in the post-divorce case until November 
1996 when he filed a written notice of withdrawal as Castleton's lawyer.7 (Trial Exh. 14 
attached as App. F.; Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 58, 59.) Zoll filed the notice because his ". . . staff 
was seeing some activity with [opposing counsel] and wanted to make sure she was clear and 
the court file was clear that the prior termination had been effectuated by the formal record or 
some formal filing in the file itself." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63.) Zoll's office sent a copy of the 
notice of withdrawal to Castleton at that time. (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63; Trial Exh. 14.) 
2. Zoll Begins, But Does Not Complete, Efforts to Withdraw 
During 1995, 
During 1995, Castleton began falling behind on his payments of Zoll's billing 
statements.8 (R. 1753; Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 75, 76.) Before August 1995, Zoll believed that he 
had already withdrawn as Castleton's lawyer and that Castleton understood this. (Tr. at R. 
1983, pp. 76-79.) Zoll nevertheless prepared and sent to Castleton a letter dated August 2, 
7
 Zoll did testify that he had a "very vague" memory that he and Castleton reached an "understanding" 
that it was ". . .not necessary to pursue or press the issue on the Objection." (Tr. at R. 55.) However, Zoll 
could not recall when the "understanding" was reached, did not confirm it in writing, did not withdraw the 
Objection, and did not inform opposing counsel, the court clerk or the assigned judge of the existence or terms of 
the vaguely recalled "understanding." (Tr. at R. 1983 at pp. 57-59.) Moreover, Zoll never referenced this 
"understanding" before trial in either his letter to Castleton's lawyer in this case, in his reply to Castleton's 
CrossClaim, or in opposition to Castleton's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 94-99.) Indeed, 
ZoU's pre-trial position on the issue of his written Objection was that "an objection that is not resolved in a year is 
a dead objection." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 98.) Zoll never took the position before trial that he and Castleton had an 
"understanding" not to pursue the Objection. Even ZoU's trial counsel abandoned the "understanding" argument 
in his summation: "And [ZoU's] story basically is, I've represented this man on three matters. I finished them all 
except for the objection." (Tr. at R. 1985 at 667:16-18.) (Emphasis added.) And even if such an 
"understanding" was reached, it is undisputed that Zoll remained in the case and did not file his withdrawal until 
November 1996, seven months after he helped his other client (Ricks) to collect a debt from Castleton. (Trial 
Exh. 14 attached as App. F.) 
8
 This was not surprising to Zoll given his admitted concern at the outset of the engagement about 
Castleton's ability to pay ZoU's bUls because he knew that Castleton was financially strapped. (Tr. at R. 1983, 
pp. 28-30.) 
7 
1995 ("August 1995 Letter"). (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 79; Trial Exh. 21 attached as App. J.) The 
August 1995 Letter stated in pertinent part: 
I will accept a 15% reduction in the amount of your bill if it is 
paid in cash within two (2) weeks from the date hereof. In any 
event, if you do not make arrangements with our office to begin 
payment on your bill within two (2) weeks from the date hereof, I 
will have no other option but to withdraw as your counsel in the 
matters for which this law firm has represented you and to pursue 
collection of this amount from you. 
(Emphasis added.) ZoU admitted that his August 1995 Letter " . . . was not as clear as [he] 
would have liked" given his belief that he had already withdrawn, but his use of the future 
tense "will" to describe his intent to withdraw later if Castleton failed to make arrangements to 
pay his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 84, 85.) 
In response to ZoU's August 1995 Letter, Castleton made a $100 payment to ZoU's 
firm in September 1995. (Finding No. 6, R. 1754; Trial Exh. 22.) Even though Zoll testified 
that his August 1995 Letter evidenced his immediate withdrawal, ZoU's firm did not pursue 
collection of the account from Castleton (as threatened in the letter) until after trial in this case 
was completed, and did not withdraw as counsel in the post-divorce case (as threatened in the 
letter) until November 1996. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 82, 83; Trial Exh. 14.) Indeed, on April 2 
or 3, 1996, Castleton received a billing statement from Zoll's law firm which charged 
Castleton for one hour of "professional services rendered" by one of ZoU's employees for 
Castleton on March 21, 1996.9 (Trial Exh. 27 attached as App. K.) 
9
 Castleton did testify that Zoll himself did not perform further legal work for Castleton after Zoll filed 
the Objection to the Proposed Order in the divorce case in February 1995. (Tr. at R. 1988 at 89:4-7.) Castleton 
never testified, however, that Zoll's staff did not perform the professional services described in the Zoll & Branch 
billing statement. And while Zoll has suggested and may argue that his April 1996 billing statement to Castleton 
was a mistake, there is no evidence that Zoll told Castleton it was a mistake before or at the time of the April 8, 
1996 meeting at Zoll's office at which Zoll facilitated the seizure of Castleton's property. 
8 
3. Still Serving as Castleton's Lawyer. Zoll Ambushes Castleton 
and Facilitates the Seizure of Castletonfs Property, 
On April 8, 1996-while the written Objection that Zoll had prepared and filed for 
Castleton was still pending in the divorce action, five days after Zoll issued a billing statement 
to Castleton reflecting "professional services rendered" recently by Zoll's office, and more 
than seven months before Zoll filed his withdrawal as Castleton's lawyer in the divorce 
action~Zoll called Castleton and asked him to come immediately to his office to meet with Zoll 
and Ricks about Castleton's employment relationship with Ricks' company.10 (Finding No. 11, 
R. 1755.) Zoll failed to disclose in advance to Castleton that Zoll and Ricks intended to accuse 
Castleton of having stolen money from Ricks by submitting inflated invoices. IcL Zoll never 
prepared or provided any oral or written disclosures of any potential conflict of interest in his 
simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks; never had either client sign any waiver of 
conflict; and never told Castleton it would be prudent for him to retain independent legal 
counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him about the implications of the conflict 
of interest. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 106, 107.)11 Zoll failed to take this action even though he 
knew the meeting with Castleton would address a "very serious situation" which was "really 
sensitive [and] ugly." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 125; Trial Exh. 24 at p. 1.) Indeed, Castleton 
subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Class A misdemeanor theft. (Finding No. 17, R. 
1757.) 
10
 Zoll had previously represented Ricks in several matters and considered him to be a "good" client 
because, unlike Castleton, he always paid his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983 at 102:1-17.) 
11
 Zoll's testimony on this point was emphatic and unapologetic: "Obviously that wasn't in the 
discussion." (R. 1260.) 
9 
Zoll tape recorded a portion of the April 8, 1996 meeting between himself, Ricks and 
Castleton. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 112-14; Trial Exh. 24 attached as App. C.) The transcript of 
their conversation reflects that Castleton immediately asked Zoll to confirm that he was also 
serving as Castleton's lawyer. (Trial Exh. 24 at p.2.) Zoll responded by saying that he 
"represented [Castleton] in [Castleton's] divorce" and that "[Zoll] ha[s] nothing to do with that 
in this case." Id. at p. 3. The transcript also reflects that Zoll accused Castleton of engaging 
in criminal misconduct by presenting inflated invoices to Ricks. IcL It further reflects Zoll's 
belief that Castleton's motivation for overcharging Ricks was the financial pressure Castleton's 
former wife was placing on him-the same former wife with whom Zoll was dealing when he 
represented Castleton in the divorce case. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.)n 
Zoll described Castleton's predicament at the April 8, 1996 meeting as ". . . like 
having a kid with his hand in the cookie jar when [Castleton] realized we had the information 
[about the inflated invoices]." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 115.) Ricks described Castleton's plight in 
much the same way: ". . . i t was pretty apparent that, you know, Doug was caught, and he 
was pretty contrite, I would say." (Tr. at R. 1984, p. 452.) 
Near the end of the tape recorded meeting, Zoll and Ricks questioned Castleton about 
his purchase of "computers, equipment and software" which Zoll had determined were located 
at Castleton's apartment. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 5.) After Castleton told Zoll that Castleton's 
computer equipment was at his apartment, Zoll decided to stop recording the conversation, 
12
 The transcript shows the following exchange: 
Zoll: Why did you do it, Doug? 
Castleton: Just didn't have enough money to make ends meet. 
Zoll: Pressure from your ex? 
(Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) 
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remarking, "well let me tell you what, what we, what I think we should do." (Trial Exh. 24 at 
p. 5.) Zoll then "facilitated" Ricks' seizure of Castleton's computers, hardware, software, and 
"other electronic equipment" as "security for the debt that Castleton owed Ricks." (Finding 
Nos. 13 and 35, R. 1755, 56, 60.) The trial court expressly concluded that "Zoll facilitated 
this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and 
an agreement between the parties," and that Zoll was " . . . aware that certain property was 
taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security purposes." 
(Finding No. 35, R. 1760.) 
When Ricks arrived at Castleton's apartment right after their meeting with Zoll, he took 
not only the computer equipment, but a multitude of additional items owned by Castleton and 
his fiance, Roderick. (Finding No. 14, R. 1756; Trial Exh. 29.) These items included 
hundreds of compact discs, laser discs, a microwave oven, stereo equipment, a television set 
that Castleton had bought for his children, a cell phone, and other property and personal 
effects. (Trial Exh. 29; Tr. at R. 1985, pp. 476, 477.)13 
The next day, April 9, 1996, Zoll prepared and provided Castleton with a written 
Notice of Termination to extinguish Castleton's independent contractor relationship with Ricks. 
(Finding No. 15, R. 1756; Tr. at R. 1983, p. 129.) The Notice of Termination was addressed 
to Castleton by Zoll and stated in pertinent part: 
Pursuant to our understanding and as you have consented, we 
[Zoll and Ricks] have picked up and caused to be delivered to the 
13
 The trial court determined that these additional items of property were taken with Castleton's 
"consent." (Finding No. 14, R. 1756.) However, the trial court ignored the 1999 Settlement Agreement between 
Castleton and Ricks which voided their April 1996 settlement agreement and, with it, the understanding that the 
property seizure was "consensual." (Trial Exh. Q at p. 4; App. E.) And given the plainly coercive nature of the 
property transfer arrangement which Zoll had "facilitated," and given his breach of fiduciary duty, any such 
consent was obviously voidable. See Argument C, infra at pp. 29-34. 
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NS Group offices certain equipment, files, software, furnishings 
and the like from your apartment to be held by NS Group offices 
pending our further investigation of the amount of money that has 
been inappropriately obtained by you. 
(Trial Exh. 25 attached as App. L.) (Emphasis added.)14 
Zoll then drafted a Settlement Agreement which Ricks and Castleton signed on April 
19, 1996 ("1996 Settlement Agreement"). (R. 1756; Trial Exh. 26 attached as App. M.) The 
1996 Settlement Agreement stated, among other things, that Castleton acknowledged liability 
to Ricks in an amount to be determined through a future accounting and that the property was 
being "consensually" held to secure Castleton's repayment pending the accounting. (Finding 
No. 16, R. 1756; Trial Exh. 26 at p. 2.) 
In the face of these facts, the trial court ruled that while \ . .Mr. Zoll may have used 
very poor judgment in this matter, and could have done much more to clarify the issue with 
Castleton at the time of the meeting in April of 1996, under the circumstances of this case Q he 
did not breach any duty of loyalty or confidentiality owed to Mr. Castleton under Rule 1.9 or 
Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct." (Finding No. 32, R. 1760.) 
The court further ruled that " . . . under all the circumstances, as of the April 1996 
meeting, there was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton," Finding No. 
25, R. 1758; that the three legal matters in which Zoll had represented Castleton were not 
substantially factually related to the matter in which Zoll was assisting Ricks in collecting a 
debt from Castleton, Finding No. 29, R. 1759; that Castleton " . . . failed to provide the court 
14
 Even though Zoll's Notice of Termination explicitly referenced Zoll's recognition that the additional 
property he and Ricks had confiscated, i.e., "furnishings and the like," went far beyond what was discussed 
during the tape-recorded discussion at Zoll's office the evening before, the trial court apparently rejected 
Castleton's argument that Zoll's Notice of Termination was a ratification of Ricks' taking of these additional 
items. This argument was preserved at Tr. at R. 1983, p. 5:12-18; R. 1985, p. 685:11-25, p. 686:1-6. 
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with evidence of any specific information obtained by ZoU in his representation of Castleton 
that was either confidential or that was not otherwise generally known, that could subsequently 
have been used against Castleton to Ricks' advantage," Finding No. 31, R. 1760; that " . . . 
Zoll had nothing to do with the taking of additional property by Ricks, the damage to the 
property while in Ricks' possession, or the circumstances of Ricks failing to return property 
that he agreed to return," Conclusion No. 9, R. 1762; that Ricks' seizure and failure to return 
Castleton's property was ". . .an independent intervening cause that severed the connection 
between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages," Conclusion No. 12, R. 1762; and 
that "Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to Zoll's action." 
(Conclusion No. 13, R. 1763.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Zoll Was Castleton's Lawyer at the Time Zoll Helped His Other 
Client Collect a Debt from Castleton, 
When Zoll facilitated Ricks' seizure of Castleton's property, Zoll was in an attorney-
client relationship with Castleton. Specifically, Zoll was counsel of record for Castleton in 
Castleton's post-divorce proceeding. Zoll had vigorously defended Castleton in an evidentiary 
contempt hearing and at a trial to modify Castleton's divorce decree in that case. Once Zoll 
prepared and filed his Objection to the Proposed Order prepared by opposing counsel, Zoll 
was precluded by the court's rules of practice and case law from withdrawing without court 
approval. And even assuming that Zoll could unilaterally withdraw without court approval, he 
did not do so until November 1996-more than seven months after he ambushed Castleton at 
his law office. Therefore, until Zoll completed his withdrawal, he continued to be Castleton's 
lawyer. 
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2. Even If it is Determined ZoU Was Not Castleton!s Lawyer at the 
Time Zoll Was Representing Ricks, the Matter in Which Zoll was 
Representing Ricks Was Substantially Factually Related to the Three 
Matters in Which Zoll Previously Had Represented Castleton, As 
Such. Zoll Could Not Serve as Ricks1 Lawyer in Collecting a Debt 
From Castleton. 
The legal and ethical proscriptions against disclosure of confidential client information 
mean that a lawyer cannot represent a client against a former client in the same or a 
substantially factually related matter in which the current client's interest is materially adverse 
to that of the former client, unless the former client consents after consultation. Under Utah 
law, this rule is designed to prevent even the possibility that a lawyer might use information 
given in confidence by a former client in a later action against that client. 
In this case, the three previous matters in which Zoll represented Castleton~the divorce 
case, the bankruptcy case, and the collection case-each involved the efforts of a creditor to 
collect a debt from Castleton. This is precisely what was at issue in Zoll's efforts to assist 
Ricks in collecting a debt from Castleton through a seizure of Castleton1 s property. Because of 
this commonality of issues and Castleton1 s entrustment of confidential information with Zoll, 
Zoll was prohibited from taking a position adverse to Castleton and from exploiting this 
confidential information against Castleton. 
3. ZoU Breached His Fiduciary Duties of Lovaltv. Confidentiality and 
Good Faith to Castleton. 
Lawyers owe their clients an elevated fiduciary duty to exercise utmost honesty, fair 
dealing, and fidelity. A critically important component of this duty is the responsibility to act 
with undivided loyalty toward the client. Zoll violated his duty of loyalty to Castleton by 
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representing another client in the collection of a debt from Castleton. Indeed, the dimensions 
of Zoll's misconduct are mind-boggling. They include: 
- Zoll's decision to have Castleton appear at his office without informing Castleton of 
the true reason for the meeting~to confront Castleton with evidence that he had purposely 
overbilled ZoU's other client, Ricks. 
- Zollfs failure to prepare or provide any disclosures of potential conflicts of interest in 
his simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks. 
- Zoll's failure to have either client sign any waiver of conflict. 
- ZoU's failure to advise Castleton that it would be prudent for him to retain 
independent legal counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him about the 
implications of Zoll's conflict of interest. 
- ZoU's failure to abort the meeting when Castleton asked him to confirm that Zoll was 
also serving as Castleton's lawyer. 
- Zoll's accusation at the meeting that Castleton was guilty of criminal misconduct. 
- ZoU's use of Castleton's confidential financial information to help enforce Ricks' 
claim. 
- Zoll's orchestration of Ricks' seizure of Castleton's property. 
- ZoU's overreaching by having Castleton sign a document acknowledging that the 
seizure was "consenual." 
It is difficult to conceive of conduct more at odds with the lawyer's duty of loyalty, 
confidentiality and fair dealing. The trial court clearly erred by characterizing Zoll's 
misconduct as merely "very poor judgment," and not as flagrant breaches of fiduciary duty. 
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4. The Trial Court's Own Findings of Fact and the Underlying 
Evidence Flatly Contradict Its Determination That Zoll Was Not 
Responsible for the Loss of the Property That Ricks Seized from 
Castleton, 
Among the more dubious of the trial court's conclusions was its declaration that "as a 
matter of law" " . . . Zoll had nothing to do with the taking of additional property by [his other 
client] Ricks, the damage to the property while in Ricks1 possession or the circumstances of 
Ricks' failure to return the property that he had agreed to return."15 Indeed, this conclusion is 
flatly contradicted by (a) the trial court's own factual findings that "Zoll was aware that certain 
property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security 
purposes [and] Zoll facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a 
notice of termination letter and an agreement between the parties";16 (b) Zoll's testimony that 
he thought it was a "good idea that Mr. Ricks take the property";17 (c) Zoll's own written 
notice the day after the seizure that both he and Ricks had confiscated Castleton's property;18 
and (d) Zoll's testimony that he never provided Castleton with the accounting that was an 
essential precondition to any return of Castleton's property.19 
These facts, taken alone, are fatal to the trial court's conclusion that Zoll's misconduct 
was not the proximate cause of Castleton's loss. When these facts are viewed in the light of 
Zoll's breach of fiduciary duty, they compellingly establish that Zoll substantially assisted 
15
 Conclusion No. 9, R. 1762. 
16
 Finding No. 35, R. 1760. 
17
 Tr. atR. 1983 at 129:1-5. 
18
 Trial Exh. 25. 
19
 Tr. atR. 1983 at 131:1-3. 
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Ricks in his campaign to strip Castleton of his property. Zoll, therefore, was the legal cause of 
Castleton's loss. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary cannot stand. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ZOLL WAS CASTLETON'S LAWYER AT THE TIME ZOLL 
HELPED HIS OTHER CLIENT COLLECT A DEBT FROM, AND 
SEIZE THE PROPERTY OF, CASTLETON, 
If a lawyer desires to withdraw from representation, he or she must provide clear notice 
to the client and comply with any applicable rules requiring court approval. See, e.g.. Hanlin 
v. Mitchelson. 794 F.2d 834, 842 (2nd Cir. 1986) (". . . a withdrawing attorney must give a 
client fclear and unambiguous' notice of the attorney's intent to withdraw from representation. 
Beyond this notice requirement, the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a broader 
duty [to comply with court-imposed notice requirements and to avoid foreseeable prejudice to 
the rights of the client]."); Columbus Credit Co. v. Evans. 613 N.E.2d 671, 675 (Ohio App. 
1992) ("An attorney is not free to withdraw from the relationship absent notice to his client 
and, if required by the rules of court where the attorney is representing the client, permission 
from the court."); In re: Pullev. 182 Bankr. Rptr. 35, 35 n.l (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1995) ("[t]he 
fact that defendant's counsel has moved to withdraw as counsel does not relieve him of the 
duty to represent his client until such time as an order is entered granting permission to 
withdraw as counsel"); Cardot v. Lauff. 262 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1980) ("Most courts require 
that before an attorney can unilaterally sever the attorney-client relationship, he must give 
reasonable notice to his client of his intention to withdraw. If the withdrawal involves a matter 
pending in court, there is the further requirement the attorney secure court permission for his 
withdrawal."). 
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Moreover, the client's failure to stay current on his account with the lawyer does not 
justify the lawyer's uncommunicated and unapproved abandonment of the client: 
Once a lawyer accepts retainer to represent a client, he is 
obligated to exert his best efforts wholeheartedly to advance the 
client's legitimate interests with fidelity and diligence until he is 
relieved of that obligation either by his client or the court. The 
failure of a client to pay for his services does not relieve a lawyer 
of his duty to perform them completely and on time, save only 
when relieved as above. 
In the Matter of Daggs. 187 N.W.2d 227, 228 (Mich. 1971). 
As the Mississippi Supreme Court aptly observed in Hurst v. Southwest Mississippi 
Legal Services Corp., 610 So.2d 374, 382 (Miss. 1992): 
. . . [A]ny time an attorney undertakes to represent a client in any 
court of record in this state, there attaches at that moment a legal, 
ethical, professional and moral obligation to continue with that 
representation until such time as he is properly relieved by the 
court of record before whom he has undertaken to represent a 
client. This is true regardless of the circumstances under which 
his representation of that client may be terminated. This 
withdrawal may be accomplished only by the filing of a motion 
with the court with proper notice to the client. 
(quoting, Mvers v. Mississippi State Bar. 480 S.2d 1080, 1092 (Miss. 1986). 
This Court has long recognized that unless and until the lawyer withdraws from the 
engagement, his fiduciary duty to the client continues until entry of final judgment. Lundberg 
v. Backman. 358 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1961). Until withdrawal occurs, the lawyer's status as 
counsel of record " . . . constitute(s) his client's appearance pursuant to the agency relationship 
that exists between a client and an attorney." Loporto v. Hoegemann. 982 P.2d 586, 589 
(Utah App. 1999). And the lawyer's withdrawal from the case is not complete until he 
prepares and files with the trial court a written notice to that effect. Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 
581, 582 (Utah 1984). 
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This requirement of written notice is found in Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, which governs "all counsel in civil proceedings and trial courts of record." 
C.J.A. 4-506. It provides that when a motion has been filed and the trial court has not issued 
an order on that motion, "an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the 
court." C.J. A. 4-506(1). Notably, the rule also provides that if a lawyer " . . . withdraws 
under circumstances where court approval is not required, the notice of withdrawal shall 
include a statement by the attorney that no motion has been filed on which the court has not 
issued an order . . . ." C.J.A. 4-506(2) (emphasis added). 
These principles and rules compel the conclusion that Zoll was still serving as 
Castleton1 s lawyer during Zoll's April 1996 ambush and inquisition of Castleton and the 
seizure of his property. Zoll was counsel of record for Castleton in Castleton's divorce case. 
(Finding No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-14.) In that role, Zoll filed numerous pleadings and 
papers and handled at least two court hearings for Castleton during 1994. (R. 1753; Trial 
Exhs. 1-13.) In early 1995, Zoll prepared and filed his written Objection to opposing 
counsel's Proposed Order. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 50-52; Trial Exh. 9 attached as App. I.) The 
Objection remained on file with the court until it was resolved in early 1997. (Trial Exh. 12 at 
20
 As indicated at n. 7, supra. Zoll did testify that he had a "very vague" memory that he and 
Castleton reached an "understanding" that it was ". . .not necessary to pursue or press the issue on the 
Objection." Tr. at R. 55.) However, Zoll could not recall when the "understanding" was reached, did not 
confirm it in writing, did not withdraw the Objection, and did not inform opposing counsel, the court clerk or the 
assigned judge of the existence or terms of the vaguely recalled "understanding." (Tr. at R. 1983 at pp. 57-59.) 
Moreover, Zoll never referenced this "understanding" before trial in either his letter to Castleton's lawyer in this 
case, in his reply to Castleton's Cross-Claim, or in opposition to Castleton's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr. 
at R. 1983, pp. 9499.) Indeed, Zoll's pre-trial position on the issue of his written Objection was that "an 
objection that is not resolved in a year is a dead objection." (Tr. at R. 1983, p. 98.) Zoll never took the position 
before trial that he and Castleton had an "understanding" not to pursue the Objection. Even Zoll's trial counsel 
abandoned the "understanding" argument in his summation: "And [Zoll's] story basically is, I've represented this 
man on three matters. I finished them all except for the objection." (Tr. at R. 1985 at 667:16-18.) (Emphasis 
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Although the trial court concluded that the attorney-client relationship between Zoll and 
Castleton ended before the April 1996 meeting at Zoll's office and the property seizure at 
Castleton's home, see Finding No. 25 and Conclusion Nos. 2 and 3, Zoll, as a matter of law, 
clearly remained as Castleton's lawyer of record in the divorce case at least until November 
1996 when he filed his written notice of withdrawal.21 Even then, Zoll failed to seek or obtain 
court approval for the withdrawal, as required by Rule 4-506(1), or certify in his notice that 
there were no unresolved motions, as required by Rule 4-506(2). This obviously destroys 
added.) 
And even if such an "understanding" was reached, it is undisputed that Zoll remained in the case and 
did not file his withdrawal until November 1996, seven months after he helped his other client (Ricks) to collect a 
debt from Castleton. (Trial Exh. 14 attached as App. F.) This "understanding," therefore, could not and did not 
terminate the lawyer-client relationship. 
21
 Amazingly, Zoll's expert witness, Lee Rudd, did not even consider this issue in opining that the 
attorney-client relationship had ended by April 1996: 
Q. So you think it is permissible for a lawyer to withdraw unilaterally when he 
has filed an objection that hasn't yet been resolved? 
A. I would (inaudible) that question. I haven't looked at that issue to that effect. 
(Tr. atR. 1985 at 638:10-14.) 
In addition, Mr. Rudd did not consider Lundberg v. Backman. 358 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1961), in 
which this Court held that until the lawyer withdraws, his fiduciary duty continues until the entry of final 
judgment. (Tr. at R. 1985 at 635:2-10.) Indeed, in rendering his opinion, Mr. Rudd testified that he ". . . only 
looked at [his own] conduct and that of the attorneys that [he] dealt with over the last thirty years." (Tr. at R. 
1985 at 635:12-13.) Mr. Rudd explained his opinion that Zoll withdrew as Castleton's lawyer in August 1995 as 
follows: 
And if you go a long period of time with no communication, that's an indication and an 
allowance for the attorney to realize that he does not represent the client and the client 
would be unable to make a reasonable decision that he is represented by an attorney. 
(Tr. atR. 1985 at 636:1-6.) 
By contrast, Castleton's expert witness, Ellen Maycock, opined that Zoll committed a ". . . very 
serious breach of [his] duty to his client" which is not even a "close question." (Tr. at R. 1984 at 277:1-5.) 
When Ms. Maycock testified on cross-examination that a lawyer is legally required " . . . to file a withdrawal or 
get court permission to withdraw in all pending matters," Zoll's counsel conceded "[w]ell, that would be nice if 
we had that, but under the facts of this case, we don't have t h a t . . . . " (Tr. al R. 1984 at 298:2-5.) 
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Zollfs anemic trial story that he had a "very vague" memory that he and Castleton had an 
"understanding" not to pursue the Objection. (See n. 20, supra.) If the Objection truly had 
been withdrawn, Zoll was required to certify that fact in his notice. He did not do so. 
Until the withdrawal was filed, ZoU's opposing counsel either believed he was still 
representing Castleton or was at least confused about ZoU's status. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 63, 
64.) This is precisely why Utah law provides that until a lawyer is validly "out," the lawyer is 
undeniably "in." For Zoll, this means that he remained as Castleton's lawyer until he 
completed his withdrawal. Loporto. 982 P.2d at 589; Sperrv. 694 P.2d at 582; Lundberg, 358 
P.2d at 989. 
However, according to the trial court, "the attorney-client relationship between Zoll 
and Castleton ended when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 1995 
letter." (Conclusion No. 2, R. 1761.) The letter stated in relevant part: 
I will accept a 15% reduction in the amount of your bill if it is 
paid in cash within two (2) weeks from the date hereof. In any 
event, if you do not make arrangements with our office to begin 
payment on your bill within two (2) weeks from the date hereof, I 
will have no other option but to withdraw as your counsel in the 
matters for which this law firm has represented you and to pursue 
collection of this amount from you. 
The trial court's reliance on the August 1995 Letter was misplaced for several reasons. 
First, Zoll himself admitted that the letter "was not as clear as [he] would have liked." (Tr. at 
R. 1983, pp. 84, 85.) Zoll believed he had already withdrawn and that Castleton understood 
this, yet Zoll employed the future tense "will" to describe his intent to withdraw later if 
Castleton did not make arrangements to begin paying his bill. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 76-79.) 
Second, even ZoU's own expert witness testified that the August 1995 Letter, by itself, was not 
enough to terminate the attorney-client relationship. (Tr. at R. 1985 at 629: 5, 6.) 
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Next, the law is clear that if a lawyer fails to clearly inform his client of his intention to 
withdraw, the relationship is not terminated. This point was illustrated in North Carolina State 
Bar v. Sheffield. 326 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. App. 1985). In that case, a lawyer claimed that his 
withdrawal from the case had been effected by his preparation of a letter in which he wrote 
that "I do not see that I can handle this for you for a number of reasons," and added, "[p]lease 
come to this office some time this week or next so we can discuss this." According to the 
court, "at best, this letter bespeaks a somewhat equivocal intention on the [lawyer's] part to 
end his involvement with the lawsuit. It is not the legal equivalent of withdrawing from 
representation." Id. at 326. 
Zoll's August 1995 Letter is similarly deficient. Specifically, the Letter, on its face, 
was not a declaration of a present intent to terminate the relationship. Rather, it only reflected 
Zoll's intention to withdraw in the future if Castleton failed to make arrangements to pay his 
bill.22 While the trial court concluded that Castleton made no such arrangements, it is 
undisputed that Castleton did make a $100 payment soon after and in response to the August 
1995 Letter. (Finding No. 6, R. 1754; Trial Exh. 22.) By doing so, Castleton plainly 
complied with the letter's admonition that he make "arrangements" "to begin payment." If 
Zoll believed that Castleton1 s partial payment was not enough to justify Zoll's continuing as 
Castleton's lawyer, it was Zoll who was obligated to clearly notify Castleton of that fact. 
Castleton was not obligated to read Zoll's mind. 
22
 Even Zoll acknowledged this in the trial brief he submitted to the court: "Eight months prior to the 
April 8, 1996 meeting, Castleton received Zoll's August 2, 1995 letter placing Castleton on notice of Zoll's 
intent to withdraw if payment in full or a payment schedule satisfactory to Zoll was not made and followed." (R. 
1672.) (Emphasis added.) 
22 
The August 1995 Letter is further unavailing to Zoll because it violates the 
requirements of Rule 1.16(d) which states that "[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interest, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client . . . ." Zoll's admittedly unclear letter was not reasonable 
notice to Castleton that the lawyer-client relationship had actually and definitively ended. 
Moreover, the trial court's characterization on the August 1995 Letter as the event that 
signaled the end of the lawyer-client relationship completely ignores the undisputed fact that 
only several days before Zoll's April 1996 ambush and inquisition of Castleton, Zoll's law 
firm had performed one hour of legal services for Castleton for which it had billed Castleton. 
(Trial Exh. 27; App. K.) There is simply no principled basis for concluding, as the trial court 
did, that the parties' professional relationship had ended months before Zoll's firm was still 
performing services for, and sending bills to, Castleton. 
Finally, the trial court's conclusion that the lawyer-client relationship had ended in 
August 1995 ignores Castleton's tape recorded plea that Zoll confirm that he was still 
representing Castleton as Zoll began his inquisition. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2.) Given the fact 
that seven months later even the lawyer representing Mr. Castleton's former wife believed Zoll 
was or may have been representing Castleton, Tr. at R. 1983, p. 63, Castleton's confusion-
the confusion of an unsophisticated layperson forced to interpret his lawyer's many mixed 
signals-is certainly understandable. 
At the very least, Castleton's tape-recorded utterance during the April 1996 
interrogation that he believed Zoll was still representing him required Zoll to treat Castleton as 
an unrepresented party under Rule 4.3(a) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and to 
urge Castleton to seek counsel. More important, however, Castleton's utterance is impossible 
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to reconcile with the trial court's conclusion that the relationship had been terminated through a 
hopelessly confused and confusing letter from a lawyer who presumably knew how to write 
clearly. 
Under these circumstances-including Zoll's status as Castleton's counsel of record in 
the divorce case, Zoll's clumsy, ambiguous and misleading August 1995 Letter, Castleton's 
partial payment in response to the Letter, the perception of Zoll's adversary that Zoll was still 
serving as Castleton's lawyer as late as November 1996, Zoll's billing of Castleton for legal 
services performed just days before the ambush, Zoll's failure to pursue collection of the 
account from Castleton, and Castleton's tape recorded belief that Zoll was still serving as his 
lawyer-Zoll was Castleton's lawyer during April 1996. 
The trial court's decision to the contrary cannot stand. Its factual findings on this issue 
are clearly erroneous because they are either against the clear weight of the evidence or are 
enough to allow this Court to reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made.23 Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp.. 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). 
The Court, therefore, should reverse the trial court's decision and rule, as a matter of law, that 
at the time Zoll orchestrated the seizure of Castleton's property in April 1996, he was still 
acting as Castleton's lawyer. 
23
 This is especially true if this Court accords little deference to the trial court's findings in the manner 
specified by Houghton, 962 P.2d at 61 (Because ". . .the Court has a special interest in administering the law 
governing attorney ethical rules, a trial court's discretion is limited.") Even under a traditional standard of 
review, however, the trial court's determination that Zoll and Castleton were not in an attorney-client relationship 
as of April 1996 is clearly erroneous. 
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B. EVEN IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT ZOLL WAS NOT CASTLETONfS 
LAWYER AT THE TIME ZOLL WAS REPRESENTING RICKS, ZOLL 
WAS LEGALLY PRECLUDED FROM TAKING A POSITION ADVERSE 
TO CASTLETON AND FROM USING CASTLETON'S CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION AGAINST HIM, 
"Even in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, circumstances may give 
rise to an implied professional relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby 
invoking ethical mandates governing the practice of law." Margulies by Margulies v. 
Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). The limited extent to which a lawyer can take a 
position adverse to a former client is described in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.24 
Specifically, Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall 
not thereafter: 
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the 
former client consents after consultation; or 
(b) use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit 
with respect to a client or when the information has become 
generally known. 
The purpose of Rule 1.9 is " . . . to prevent the betrayal of a professional trust arising 
out of the lawyer-client relationship." Houghton v. Dent, of Health. 962 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 
1998). The Rule is "specifically concerned with a lawyer's acquisition of confidential 
information." Houghton. 962 P.2d at 61. Houghton makes clear that the term "substantially 
24
 While the Scope (Preamble) portion of the Rules states that "violation of a Rule should not give rise to 
a cause of action, nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached," the Rules ". . . 
certainly constitute some evidence of the standards required of attorneys." Woodruff v. Tomlin. 616 F.2d 924, 
936 (6th Cir. 1980). Accord. Griffith v. Tavlor. 937 P.2d 297, 300 n. 7 (Ariz. 1997) (". . . professional ethics 
rules are evidence of the scope of the duties owed by an attorney to a client or a former client.") See generally. 
Annot., Malpractice & Liability of Attorney Representing Conflicting. Interests. 28 A.L.R. 3d 389 (1969). 
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factually related matter" in Rule 1.9(a) means a clear factual connection between the former 
and present representations: 
In construing Utah's Rule 1.9(a), the federal courts and the Utah 
Court of Appeals have referred to the necessity for a distinct, 
factual link between the former and present representations. In 
SLC Ltd. v. Bradford Group West. Inc., 999 F.2d 464, 467 (10th 
Cir. 1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit stated that Utah's requirement "focus[es] on the factual 
nexus between the prior and current representations rather than a 
narrower identity of legal issues." Similarly, the court in Poly 
Software Int'l. Inc. v. Yu Su. 880 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Utah 
1995), referred to "substantial factual threads connecting the two 
matters." 
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If the former and present representations are substantially factually related, the law 
presumes that the lawyer received confidential information: "The test presumes that the lawyer 
acquired confidential information from the former client if the subject matter of the current 
representation (of a client whose interests are adverse to those of the former client) is the same 
as or substantially related to the subject matter of the former representation." Houghton. 962 
P.2d at 62 (quoting ABA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 51:201 (1997)). 
In this case, there can be no question that there was a distinct factual connection 
between the three cases in which ZoU formerly25 represented Castleton and the case in which 
ZoU represented Ricks against Castleton. Each of the three previous cases involved a claim by 
a creditor of Castleton to collect a debt that he allegedly owed. (Finding Nos. 1-3, R. 1753; 
Trial Exhs. 1-13, 16-19.) In Castleton's bankruptcy case, it involved a claim by the 
bankruptcy trustee to the proceeds resulting from the sale of Castleton's condominium. (Trial 
25
 Of course, it is Castleton's position that, as of April 1996, ZoU was his current counsel in the divorce 
case. See Argument A, supra. 
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Exhs. 16-18.) In the collection case, it involved an effort by a collection agency to collect a 
consumer debt. (Finding No. 2, R. 1753; Trial Exh. 19.) In the divorce case, it involved a 
claim by Castleton's former wife to collect delinquent child support and alimony. (Finding 
No. 1, R. 1753; Trial Exhs. 1-9.) Each of these cases obviously required a thorough 
understanding of Castleton's assets, liabilities, and income. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 35, 36, 152, 
277; Trial Exh. 38.) Castleton entrusted all of this personal financial information with Zoll to 
enable Zoll to effectively represent Castleton against the claims of his creditors. IcL 
In the same fashion, the principal point at issue in Ricks' claim against Castleton was 
the extent to which Castleton was indebted to Ricks and the manner in which Castleton could 
satisfy that debt through a surrender of his personal property. In helping Ricks to collect this 
debt, Zoll was doing precisely what he had previously done for Castleton in defending against 
the claims of Castleton's creditors. All of these engagements required an intimate 
understanding of Castleton's assets, liabilities and income. Indeed, no one but Zoll knew more 
about Castleton's financial condition; and who better than Zoll, acting for Ricks, could have 
more forcefully and effectively extracted Castleton's confession and orchestrated the seizure of 
his property? 
Under any fair reading of Utah law, therefore, there was a clear factual nexus between 
the prior and current representations. Because the prior and current representations shared a 
common factual link-the nature, extent and value of Castleton's assets, income and liabilities 
in a dispute with a third-party creditor seeking to collect a debt from Castleton-the 
representations were "substantially factually related" within the meaning of Rule 1.9(a). As 
such, Zoll was absolutely prohibited from pursuing Castleton on behalf of Ricks. 
27 
And wholly apart from Rule 1.9(a), Zoll's use of Castleton's confidential information 
to benefit Ricks violates not only Rule 1.9(b), but the edict of Margulies bv Margulies v. 
Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985).26 In Margulies. a law firm simultaneously represented 
a client in the prosecution of a medical malpractice action against several health care providers 
while representing two of the physician providers in a federal case involving their rights in a 
limited partnership. By virtue of the firm's representation of the physicians in the federal case, 
the firm acquired confidential financial information about the physicians which it could have 
exploited against them in the malpractice action. In requiring the firm to withdraw from both 
engagements, the court held that: 
. . . prohibitions against disclosure of client confidences and 
secrets have generally been interpreted to forbid an attorney from 
representing a client against a former client in a matter 
substantially related to the former client's representation. 
[Citations omitted.] This rule is intended to prevent [even] the 
possibility that an attorney might use information given in 
confidence by a former client in a later action against that client. 
Allowing later adverse representation when the former client's 
disclosures might be used against him could inhibit the free 
exchange of information between attorney and client which our 
legal system presupposes. 
Id. at 1202 (emphasis added). 
The court further held that "the burden of showing full disclosure rests upon the 
attorney undertaking adverse employment," and that "for client consent to be adequate in a 
conflict of interest situation, the attorney must not only inform both parties that he is 
undertaking to represent them, but must also explain the nature and implications of the conflict 
26
 It is important to note that Castleton never asked the trial court to base its decision against Zoll on the 
existence or effect of ethical rules. Rather, Castleton simply asked the court to apply the many Utah cases which 
address and resolve the issue of fiduciary misconduct through well-defined common law principles. See 
Argument C, supra. It is unclear why the trial court decided to largely confine its analysis of Zoll's fiduciary 
conduct to an examination of the ethical rules, other than to note that this is what Zoll asked the court to do. 
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in enough detail so that the parties can understand why independent counsel may be desirable." 
Id. at 1203-04. Plainly, any doubt is resolved against the lawyer. 
The trial court in this case failed to heed Margulies' admonition that it is even the 
potential disclosure of confidential information that must be guarded against when a lawyer is 
considering whether he or she can permissibly take a position adverse to a former client. 
Thus, the trial court's finding tha t" . . . Castleton failed to provide any plausible argument how 
he has been placed at a disadvantage in the matter of the theft of money from Ricks, by virtue 
of any confidential information acquired by Zoll in his previous representation of Castleton," 
see Finding No. 30, is based on the faulty premise that Castleton had the burden of proving 
how he was disadvantaged by Zoll's knowledge of Castleton's financial condition and 
background. Under Margulies and Houghton, there is a presumption that if the past and 
present representations are "substantially factually related," the lawyer acquired and used 
confidential information against the former client. This Court, therefore, should reverse the 
trial court's determination that Zoll was somehow privileged to take a position adverse to his 
(supposedly) former client, Castleton. 
C. ZOLL BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF LOYALTY. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND GOOD FAITH TO CASTLETON. 
"In all relationships with clients, attorneys are required to exercise impeccable honesty, 
fair dealing, and fidelity." Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah 
App. 1996). One of the most important responsibilities of a lawyer is to act with undivided 
loyalty toward his own client: 
"Where an attorney is hired solely to represent the interest of a 
client, his fiduciary duty is of the highest order and he must not 
represent interests adverse to those of the client . . . . [B]ecause 
of his professional responsibility and the confidence and trust 
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which his client may legitimately repose in him, he must adhere 
to a high standard of honesty, integrity and good faith in dealing 
with his client." 
Id (quoting Smoot v. Lund. 369 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 1962)) (emphasis added). The lawyer's 
fiduciary duty also means: 
. . . that the attorney will become unreservedly identified with his 
clientfs interests and protect his rights. It means not only in 
dealing with the client's adversary, but also the attorney will 
adhere to the ideals of honesty and fidelity with the client; and 
that he will not use his position to take any unfair advantage of 
the special confidence which the client is entitled to repose in 
him. 
Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1204 (quoting In re: Hansen. 586 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1978)). 
This Court has been insistent that when claims arise from a fiduciary's dealings with its 
beneficiary, "such dealings should be scrutinized with great care, and the burden is upon [the 
fiduciary] to show good faith in the transaction." Sweeney v. Happy Valley. Inc.. 417 P.2d 
126, 129 (Utah 1966). Accord. Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984) ("Where a 
confidential relationship exists, a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome by 
countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove absence of unfairness 
by a preponderance of the evidence."). 
If the fiduciary agent does not discharge this burden, liability attaches, and the 
transaction tainted by the breach will be voided: 
However, if a confidential relationship is found to exist between 
parties, any transaction that benefits the party in whom trust is 
reposed is presumed to have been unfair and to have resulted 
from undue influence and fraud. [Citations omitted.] The 
benefiting party then bears the burden of persuading the fact 
finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction was 
in fact fair and not the result of fraud or undue influence. If that 
burden is not carried, the transaction will be set aside. 
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Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, "even if the [subservient party] consents], the transaction is voidable unless 
the [fiduciary agent] has disclosed to the [subservient party] all the material facts which he 
knew or should have known concerning the transaction and the transaction was fair and 
reasonable in all respects." Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 
(Utah 1988). 
The rationale for the law's abhorrence of a fiduciary agent's conflicts of interest has 
been eloquently stated: 
The rules of undivided lovaltv have developed as defensive 
responses bv the common-law nervous system to impulses of self-
interest. The rationale of these well-settled principles of 
undivided lovaltv is clear: "it is generally, if not always, 
humanly impossible for the same person to act fairly in two 
capacities and on behalf of two interests in the same transaction. 
Consciously or unconsciously he will favor one side as against the 
other where there is or may be a conflict of interest. If one of the 
interests involved is that of the trustee personally, selfishness is 
apt to lead him to give himself an advantage. If permitted to 
represent antagonistic interests, the trustee is placed under 
temptation and is apt in many cases to yield to the natural 
prompting to give himself the benefit of all doubts, or to make 
decisions which favor the third person who is competing with the 
beneficiary." [Citations omitted.] 
And in accord with this rationale, the beneficiary need 
only show that the fiduciary allowed himself to be placed in a 
position where his personal interest might conflict with the 
interests of the beneficiary. It is unnecessary to show that the 
fiduciary succumbed to this temptation, that he acted in bad faith, 
that he gained an advantage, fair or unfair, that the beneficiary 
was harmed. Indeed, the law presumes that the fiduciary acted 
disloyally, and inquiry into such matters is foreclosed. The rule 
is not intended to compensate the beneficiary for any loss he may 
have sustained or to deprive the fiduciary of any unjust 
enrichment. Its sole purpose and effect is prophylactic: the 
fiduciary is punished for allowing himself to be placed in a 
position of conflicting interests in order to discourage such 
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conduct in the future. Though equity protects the beneficiary 
with a gentle wand, it polices the fiduciary with a big stick. The 
ffiduciarvl must avoid being placed in such a position, and if he 
cannot avoid it. he may resign, or fully inform the beneficiaries 
of the conflict, or. upon so informing the court, request approval 
of his actions. Otherwise, he proceeds at his peril. 
Fulton National Bank v. Tate. 363 F.2d 562, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). 
So it is in this case. Zoll plainly attempted to serve two masters. Pledging full fealty to 
one (Ricks) at the expense of another (Castleton), Zoll ambushed, interrogated, and threatened 
Castleton. He did so for the purpose of orchestrating and facilitating a late night, self-help 
confiscation of Castleton's property. This meant that Zoll was simultaneously representing the 
accuser (Ricks) in a dispute with the accused (Castleton). He was simultaneously representing 
the creditor against the debtor, the employer against the employee, the "good" client who paid 
his bill against the client who did not. Zoll's misconduct is pervasive in scope, malicious in 
purpose, and damaging in effect. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine lawyer conduct that could be 
more destructive to the interests of a client or former client. 
Out of the chute, Zoll failed to disclose to Castleton the specific purpose for which 
Castleton was being summoned to Zoll's office-to interrogate Castleton about the manner in 
which he was billing Ricks and to extract a confession of liability. (Finding No. 11; R. 1755; 
Trial Exh. 24.) Instead, Zoll made a tactical decision to retain the element of surprise when he 
lured Castleton to his office. 
This is hardly consistent with this Court's insistence that a lawyer " . . . adhere to a 
high standard of honesty, integrity and good faith in dealing with his client." Smoot. 369 P.2d 
at 936. Nor is it consistent with the lawyer's obligation to refrain from taking "any unfair 
advantage" of the client. Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1204. The fact that Castleton agreed to come 
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to Zollfs office speaks not only to the inherently unbalanced nature of the attorney-client 
relationship, but to Castleton's plainly evident belief that Zoll was still his attorney. 
Moreover, Zoll never prepared or provided any oral or written disclosures of any 
potential conflict of interest in his simultaneous representation of Castleton and Ricks, never 
had either client sign any waiver of conflict, and never told Castleton that it would be prudent 
for him to retain independent legal counsel to accompany him to the meeting or to advise him 
about the implications of the conflict of interest. (Tr. at R. 1983, pp. 106, 107; R. 1260.) 
Zoll's failure to do so is a flagrant violation of his legal obligations to Castleton and his ethical 
obligations27 to society. Margulies. 696 P.2d at 1203-04 ("For client consent to be adequate in 
a conflict of interest situation, the attorney must not only inform both parties that he is 
undertaking to represent them, but must also explain the nature and implications of the conflict 
in enough detail so that the parties can understand why independent counsel may be 
desirable."); see also 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law. § 213 ("An attorney's representation of 
two or more clients with adverse or conflicting interests constitutes such misconduct as to 
subject the attorney to liability for malpractice, unless the attorney has obtained the consent of 
the clients after full disclosure of all effects concerning the dual representations."). 
If Zoll had any doubts about the need for such disclosures before his ambush of 
Castleton began, he certainly could have none once Castleton asked him to confirm that Zoll 
27
 These ethical obligations include those prescribed by Rule 1.4 (requiring lawyer to communicate 
clearly and diligently ". . . to the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed decisions 
regarding the representations"), by Rule 1.6 (requiring lawyer to hold inviolate confidential client information), 
by Rule 1.7 (requiring lawyer to refrain from conflicts of interest absent full disclosure after consultation with 
independent counsel), by Rule 1.9 (limiting lawyer's ability to take position adverse to former client and to exploit 
confidential information), by Rule 1.16(d) (requiring lawyer to protect client's interests in the event of 
withdrawal), by Rule 4.3(b) (requiring lawyer to assure that an unrepresented person's misunderstanding about 
the lawyer's role in the matter is reasonably corrected), and by Rule 4.4 (requiring lawyer to refrain from unfairly 
burdening a third person or obtaining evidence in a way that violates the person's legal rights). 
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was also serving as his legal counsel. (Trial Exh. 24 at p. 2; App. C.) At that point, Zoll was 
absolutely obligated to terminate the meeting, advise Castleton to obtain independent counsel, 
and to disclose the substantive implications of the conflict. Instead, Zoll blithely plowed 
forward. He accused Castleton of committing a criminal act, he pressed Castleton to explain 
what he had done, he extracted a confession, and, as the trial court concluded, he "facilitated" 
the confiscation of almost every piece of property that Castleton owned. (Trial Exh. 24; 
Finding No. 35, R. 1760; Trial Exh. 25.) 
Zoll even made the connection-through his representation of Castleton in the divorce 
case-that it was the financial pressures that Castleton's former wife had placed upon him that 
led Castleton to overbill Ricks. (Trial Exh. 26 at p. 2.) Finally, Zoll betrayed Castleton by 
drafting and presenting the so-called "Settlement Agreement" in which Castleton acknowledged 
that the late night seizure of his property was "consensual." (Trial Exh. 26 at p. 2.) 
ZoU's mistreatment of Castleton is indefensible under Utah law. Zoll could easily have 
avoided this abuse by declining Ricks' offer to engage him, by informing Castleton of the 
obvious conflict and urging him to seek independent counsel, by stopping the interrogation 
when Castleton expressed confusion about Zoll's role in the transaction, or by seeking court 
approval of the proposed engagement. 
Instead, Zoll brazenly ignored every obligation of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, 
honesty, and integrity in his dealings with Castleton. Zoll's egregious misconduct is a clear 
breach of his fiduciary duty to Castleton. Under Utah law, Castleton is entitled to void the 
transaction tainted by ZoU's breach (the seizure of Castleton's property) or recover 
compensatory and punitive damages from Zoll. The trial court's inexplicable refusal to accord 
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this relief cries out for reversal. This Court should do so and either rule as a matter of law 
that Zoll breached his fiduciary duty, or remand for a new trial. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE 
UNDERLYING EVIDENCE FLATLY CONTRADICT ITS 
DETERMINATION THAT ZOLL WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE LOSS OF THE PROPERTY THAT ZOLL'S OTHER CLIENT 
SEIZED FROM CASTLETON. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled that " . . . Zoll had 
nothing to do with the taking of additional property by Ricks, the damage to the property while 
in Ricks' possession, or the circumstances of Ricks failing to return property that he agreed to 
return," Conclusion No. 9, R. 1762; that Ricks' seizure and failure to return Castleton's 
property was " . . . an independent intervening cause that severed the connection between 
ZoU's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages," Conclusion No. 12, R. 1762; and that 
Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to ZoU's action, Conclusion 
No. 11, R. 1762 (collectively "Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions"). 
The Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions cannot be sustained because they (a) 
are contradicted by the trial court's own subsidiary findings and the underlying evidence, and 
(b) are based on the application of an incorrect legal standard governing breach of fiduciary 
claims. 
Specifically, the record establishes that the Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions 
are flatly contradicted by: 
(a) the trial court's own factual finding that "Zoll was aware that certain 
property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for 
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security purposes [and] Zoll facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together 
and drafting a notice of termination letter and an agreement between the parties";28 
(b) Zoll's testimony that he thought it was a "good idea that Mr. Ricks take the 
property";29 
(c) Zoll's own written notice the day after the seizure that both he and Ricks had 
confiscated Castleton's property;30 and 
(d) Zoll?s testimony that he never provided Castleton with the accounting that 
was an essential precondition to any return of Castleton's property.31 
Moreover, the trial court's determination that Zoll's misconduct was not the proximate 
cause of Castleton's losses was based on a clear misreading of Utah fiduciary duty case law. 
Specifically, once it is determined that the parties are in a confidential fiduciary relationship, 
". . . a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome by countervailing evidence, 
and the burden shifts to the [fiduciary agent] to prove absence of unfairness by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Baker. 684 P.2d at 636. If the fiduciary agent fails to 
discharge this burden, liability attaches and the transaction tainted by the breach can be voided. 
Von Hake. 705 P.2d at 769. This principle applies even if the subservient party has 
supposedly consented to the transaction, unless the agent has " . . . disclosed to the [subservient 
party] all the material facts which he knew or should have known concerning the transaction 
28
 Finding No. 35, R. 1760. 
29
 Tr. atR. 1983 at 129:1-5. 
30
 Trial Exh. 25. 
31
 Tr. atR. 1983 at 131:1-3. 
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and the transaction was fair and reasonable in all respects." Wheeler by and through Wheeler. 
763 P.2d at 760. 
Therefore, under Utah law, once the fiduciary agent fails to discharge his or her burden 
of showing that the challenged transaction was completely fair and reasonable, a breach of 
fiduciary duty results, and the aggrieved principal is entitled to relief without a further showing 
that the fiduciary agent's misconduct was the proximate cause of the claimed loss. Wheeler. 
763 P.2d at 760; Von Hake. 705 P.2d at 769; Baker. 684 P.2d at 636. 
In this case, the trial court ignored these principles in crafting its Proximate Cause 
Findings and Conclusions. The trial court's finding that " . . . Zoll had nothing to do with the 
taking of additional property by Ricks, damage to the property while in Ricks' possession, or 
the circumstances of Ricks failing to return property that he agreed to return," Conclusion No. 
9, R. 1762, is internally inconsistent with, and contradicted by, the court's subsidiary findings 
and the record.32 
Moreover, the trial court's conclusion that Ricks' seizure and failure to return 
Castleton's property was " . . . an independent intervening cause that severed the connection 
between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages," Conclusion No. 12, R. 1762, 
stands Utah fiduciary law on its head. It does so by focusing improperly on subsequent 
misconduct (in this case, Ricks' participation in the seizure) to trump or supersede the 
32
 Specifically, and as noted at pp. 35 and 36 above, the court specifically found that "Zoll was aware 
that certain property was taken from Castleton's home and was going to be held by Ricks for security purposes 
[and] Zoll facilitated this arrangement by getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and 
an agreement between the parties." (Finding No. 35, R. 1760.) In addition, Zoll testified that he thought it was a 
"good idea that Mr. Ricks take the property." (Tr. at R. 1983 at 129:1-5.) Moreover, the written notice that Zoll 
drafted the day after the seizure declared that both he and Ricks had confiscated Castleton's property. (Trial Exh. 
25.) Finally, Zoll testified that he never provided Castleton with the accounting that was a condition to any return 
of Castleton's property. (Tr. at R. 1983 at 131:1-3.) 
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fiduciary's concurrent misconduct (in this case, Zoll's ambush, inquisition and orchestration of 
the seizure). In other words, when the trial court failed to determine that Zoll did not 
discharge his burden of proving that the April 8, 1996 transaction was completely fair and 
reasonable, it allowed Zoll to establish a defense-"independent intervening cause "-that Zoll 
was not entitled to assert. By doing so, the trial court enabled Zoll to skirt Utah law that once 
a breach of fiduciary duty is established, the subservient party is entitled to void the transaction 
and recover damages. Thus, the trial court's decision to allow Zoll, as the breaching party, to 
invoke this proximate cause argument unfairly prevented Castleton from receiving the benefit 
of this settled principle of Utah fiduciary law. 
Finally, in ruling that Ricks' role in the seizure was the superseding proximate cause of 
Castleton's loss, the trial court failed to consider Castleton's claim that Zoll substantially 
assisted Ricks in committing his tortious conduct within the meaning of § 876 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Subsection (c) of § 876 provides that "[fjor harm resulting to a 
third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . gives 
substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, 
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 876(c); see also D.D.Z. Molerwav Freightlines. Inc.. 880 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1994) 
(recognizing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 as standard for imposing liability on 
contributing tortfeasors); Dahl v. Gardner. 853 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (D. Utah 1984) (same). 
Under the Restatement, liability also attaches "for harm resulting to a third person from 
the tortious conduct of another . . . if he . . . orders or induces the conduct, if he knows or 
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should know of circumstances that would make the conduct tortious if it were his own." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(a).33 
The trial court's Proximate Cause Findings and Conclusions cannot stand in the face of 
these principles. Its decision on these issues should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
A license to practice law not only vests the lawyer with potent powers, it imposes 
elevated professional duties. When a lawyer abuses his position, the courts "protect [] the 
beneficiary with a gentle wand [and] police the fiduciary with a big stick." Fulton National 
Bank. 363 F.2d at 572. The trial court erred in this case when it declined to employ its "big 
stick," and instead discounted and even rationalized Zollfs misconduct. 
Zollfs betrayal of Castleton cannot be tolerated. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's determination that ZoU was guilty of only "very poor judgment" and "did not breach 
any duty of loyalty or confidentiality owed to Castleton" when ZoU orchestrated the seizure of 
Castleton's property. In doing so, the Court should either (a) rule, as a matter of law, that 
ZoU breached his fiduciary duty to Castleton and remand for a determination of Castleton's 
damages, or (b) grant a new trial to enable Castleton to obtain appropriate redress against his 
predatory former lawyer. 
33
 According to comment a of this section, "if [the defendant] intends the result, it is immaterial that the 
tortious means used are not those originally contemplated provided [the defendant's] order or inducement is one of 
the contributing factors [to the third-party's claimed loss]." Under this principle, therefore, Zoll became 
responsible for the fact that Ricks seized property far beyond that which was discussed at the parties' April 8, 
1996 meeting because Zoll's clear facilitation and orchestration of the seizure was undeniably "one of the 
contributing factors" of Castleton's loss. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
CZC 2 C1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk" 
B y J ^ 
The Court sitting as trier of fact heard and received evidence in this 
matter, took the case under advisement and now finds and rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. It is undisputed that in February of 1994, Zoll represented Castleton in a post-
divorce proceeding (the "Post-Divorce Action"). Zoll entered an appearance to 
defend Castleton in a contempt proceeding in the Post-Divorce action. After the 
hearing Zoll, on behalf of Castleton, filed an objection to the proposed Order 
prepared by opposing counsel. A hearing was set on the objection for April 28, 
1995, and again in May of 1995, but the hearing was never held. 
2. Castleton filed for bankruptcy in 1994, and in the spring of 1994, Zoll entered an 
appearance in the bankruptcy Court on Castleton's behalf for the limited purpose of 
arguing a Motion for relief from an Order of the Bankruptcy Court (the "Bankruptcy 
Action"). After that hearing, a ruling was made and a final Order entered on 5/24/95, 
and no appeal was taken. 
3. On January 15,1995, Zoll filed an answer for Castleton in a collection case that was 
subsequently dismissed on June 13,1995 (the "Collection Case"). 
4. In August of 1995, Zoll sent a letter to Castleton advising Castleton that he was 
delinquent on his bill and demanded payment. Zoll stated in the letter "in any event 
if you do not make arrangements with our office to begin payment on your bill within 
two weeks from the date hereof, I will have no other option but to withdraw as your 
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counsel in the matters that this law firm has represented you and to pursue 
collection of this amount from you." Further, "if you wish to make arrangements with 
our office to begin payment on your legal bill, in order to continue to receive my 
services as your attorney, please contact my office immediately." 
5. Zoll testified and the Zoll & Branch secretary, Janeal Lindeman, testified (through 
stipulated testimony) that no contact was ever made with the firm by Castleton for 
the purpose of making arrangements to pay the bill. 
6. The Court finds that Castleton made a $100.00 payment subsequent to the August 
letter, but that the payment was made unbeknownst to Zoll. 
7. Castleton claimed that subsequent to the August letter, that a meeting was held 
between he and Zoll wherein he made arrangements for payment of the bill and Zoll 
agreed to continue to represent him. Zoll denies this meeting. The Court finds that 
no such meeting took place. 
8. Castleton testified that Zoll agreed to accept as either partial or complete payment of 
the outstanding legal bill certain printing services that were to be provided by 
Castleton. Castleton testified that he prepared handouts, printouts, and other items, 
which he says, were delivered to a Mr. Joe Rawie for delivery to Mr. Zoll. Castleton 
testified that this occurred on more than one occasion, and that the routine was for 
him to deliver the materials to Mr. Rawie, who then delivered them to Mr. Zoll. 
9. The stipulated testimony of Mr. Rawie is that he knew of no arrangement to trade 
materials for a legal bill, and that he did not receive any materials from Castleton on 
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behalf of Zoll. His testimony was also that there was no meeting between he and 
Castieton wherein they discussed such an arrangement. 
10. The Court finds that no such agreement was made, and that no materials as testified 
by Castieton were delivered to Mr. Rawle for delivery to Mr. Zoll in payment of his 
legal bill. 
11. On April 8th, 1996, eight months after the August 19th, 1995 delinquency letter, there 
was a meeting between Nathan Ricks, Castieton, and Zoll that occurred at Zoll's law 
office. Castieton had an employment relationship with Ricks. Ricks was a long-
standing client of Zoll. Before the meeting, Zoll called Castieton and asked him to 
meet with he and Ricks about his employment relationship with Ricks' company the 
N.S. Group. Zoll did not advise Castieton that they were going to confront him at the 
meeting with an allegation that he had stolen money from Ricks. 
12. At the meeting, Zoll advised Castieton that he did not represent him, but rather that 
he represented Mr. Ricks. The Court finds Exhibit "P24" to be an accurate transcript 
of a portion of that meeting. At the meeting, Mr. Castieton admitted to falsifying 
records, and in that manner took ten's of thousand's of dollars of Mr. Ricks' 
Company's money. Zoll advised Castieton at the meeting that his conduct was 
criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. Zoll did not threaten to call the Sheriff 
and have Mr. Castieton arrested, as Castieton claims. 
13. It was agreed to by Castieton and Ricks at the meeting at Zoll's office that Ricks 
would follow Castieton to his home that evening and obtain whatever computer 
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hardware and software were necessary to preserve NS Group's data which was on 
Castleton's computer, and also to obtain other property to hold as security for some 
of the money that Castleton had stolen from Ricks. Ricks and Castleton later went 
to Castleton's home, and Ricks took possession of the data and of substantial 
computer and other electronic equipment as security for the debt that Castleton 
owed Ricks. Zoll did not go with Castleton and Ricks to Castleton's home. 
14. After looking through Castleton's home, Ricks observed a substantial amount of 
electronic equipment. He then took possession of the equipment and other items, in 
excess of the amount that the parties originally contemplated at the meeting in Zoll's 
office. However, this was done with the consent of Castleton and Castleton even 
assisted in loading the property into Ricks' vehicles. 
15. On April 9th, 1996, Zoll sent a letter to Castleton advising him that his employment 
relationship with NS Group (Ricks' company) was terminated and confirmed that 
certain items of property were taken by Mr. Ricks and were to be held until a 
complete accounting was made. The letter also stated that Zoll was representing 
Nathan Ricks and NS Group. 
16. On April 19th, 1996, Castleton and Ricks entered into an agreement wherein 
Castleton admitted that he owed money to NS Group for money unlawfully taken 
from NS Group. The agreement provided that certain property and equipment was 
being held by NS Group with the consent of Ricks for security purposes. The 
agreement further provided that certain equipment would be returned to Castleton 
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upon signing the agreement, and other equipment would be retained as security 
pending an accounting of the amount owed to NS Group by Castleton. The Court 
finds that the agreement was entered into by Castleton, knowingly and voluntarily, 
and that he was under no undue duress or pressure to sign the agreement. 
17. The Court notes that Castleton was subsequently charged with felony theft in Third 
District Court and pled guilty to Class A Misdemeanor Theft, as a result of this 
incident. 
18. After the April 8, 1996 meeting and April 19, 1996 agreement, it was learned by Zoll 
and Ricks that plaintiff Suzanne Roderick, Castleton's fiancee, was claiming an 
interest in a substantial amount of property taken by Ricks as security, and that her 
claim was by virtue of an unperfected security interest taken in connection with 
certain promissory notes entered into by Castleton in favor of plaintiff Roderick. 
19. Castleton claims in this case that much of the property taken by Ricks was never 
returned and that much of the returned property was returned in a damaged state. 
20. The essence of Castleton's claim against Zoll is for damages for property either not 
returned by Ricks or damaged while in Ricks' possession. The Court notes that 
plaintiff Roderick's claims against Zoll were dismissed by this Court, and that plaintiff 
and defendant Castleton settled their claims against Ricks just days prior to the trial 
of this matter. 
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21.The Court finds that there were substantial internal inconsistencies in Castleton's 
testimony and glaring contradictions between his testimony and that of other more 
independent and objective witnesses. 
22.The Court finds that Castieton is not a credible witness. The Court feels there is a 
substantial likelihood that the action by plaintiff Roderick against Castieton was a 
sham, and that while Roderick and Castieton are technically adversaries, they have 
joined forces to bolster claims against Zoll. This sham is further evidenced by the 
fact that during the course of this litigation Roderick and Castieton have entered into 
agreements transferring their interests in the subject property back and forth at times 
that seemed to suit their needs at particular stages of the litigation. 
23. Roderick and Castieton, at the time of this trial resided together and were engaged 
to be married which further belies Roderick's claim against Zoll of intentional 
interference with her economic relationships with Castieton. 
24. Defendant Castieton claims that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred arising out of an 
attorney-client relationship. Two experts testified in this matter, both of them 
respected members of the Bar. The defendant Zoll's expert testified that in his 
opinion there was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castieton at the 
time of the April 1996 meeting, and the other expert was not retained to render an 
opinion on that specific issue. 
25. The Court finds, under all the circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there 
was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castieton. 
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26. The Court finds that neither Zoll nor Castleton subjectively believed at the time of the 
April 1996 meeting that there was an attorney-client relationship existing between 
them. 
27. The Court finds that objectively speaking Castleton could not reasonably have any 
expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll at the time of the April 1996 
meeting and after. 
28. Castleton claims even if there was no attorney-client relationship that Zoll breached 
a fiduciary duty imposed upon him by the Rules of Professional Conduct pertaining 
to representation of clients against the interest of former clients. Castleton urges 
Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct upon the Court as a basis for his 
claim. Rule 1.9(a) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client against a former 
client in the same matter or a substantially factually related matter. 
29. The Court finds that the matters in which Zoll had represented Castleton; specifically 
the Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, and the Collection Case were not 
substantially factually related to the matter involving Castleton's theft of money from 
Ricks. 
30. The Court finds that Castleton has failed to provide any plausible argument how he 
has been placed at a disadvantage in the matter of the theft of money from Ricks, by 
virtue of any confidential information acquired by Zoll in his previous representation 
of Castleton. 
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31.The Court finds that Castleton has failed to provide the Court with evidence of any 
specific information obtained by Zoll in his representation of Castleton that was 
either confidential or that was not otherwise generally known, that could 
subsequently have been used against Castleton to Rick's advantage. 
32. The Court finds on the basis of these facts that Mr. Zoll may have used very poor 
judgment in this matter, and could have done much more to clarify the issue with 
Castleton at the time of the meeting in April of 1996, but that under the 
circumstances of this case that he did not breach any duty of loyalty or confidentiality 
owed to Mr. Castleton under Rule 1.9 or Rule 1.7 of the rules of professional 
conduct. 
33. The Court finds that this is not a case where a party is seeking to have an attorney 
disqualified from representing a client, but is a case where one party is seeking 
specific monetary damages against a former attorney for breach of fiduciary duty. 
34. In regards to damages, the Court finds that Castleton has failed to produce any 
evidence that shows a causal link between the conduct of Mr. Zoll and any damages 
that Castleton may have sustained. 
35. Zoll was aware that certain property was taken from Castleton's home and was 
going to be held by Ricks for security purposes. Zoll facilitated this arrangement by 
getting the parties together and drafting a notice of termination letter and an 
agreement between the parties. 
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36. There is no evidence whatsoever that Zoll had anything to do with the taking of 
additional property, the damage while in Rick's possession, or the circumstance of 
Ricks failing to return property that he had agreed to return. 
37. The Court finds that it was not foreseeable to Zoll that Ricks would not return 
property that he had agreed to return, or that Ricks would damage property in his 
possession. 
38. Castleton has produced no evidence to establish a nexus between Zoll's conduct 
and his claimed damages. 
39. The Parties stipulated at trial that the issue of attorney's fees could be reserved to 
be handled by affidavit and briefing after the Court's ruling on liability. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. No other legal representation was undertaken by Zoll on behalf of Castleton other 
than the Post-Divorce, Bankruptcy and Collection Action. 
2. The attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton ended when Castleton 
failed to comply with the terms of the August 1995 letter. 
3. There was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton in existence at 
the time of the April 1996 meeting or thereafter. 
4. Zoll did not breach the fiduciary duty owed to Castleton by appearing at the April 
1996 meeting and by representing Ricks. 
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5. The Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, and the Collection Case are not the 
same matter nor are they substantially factually related to the matter of Ricks' claims 
against Castleton for stealing money from N.S. Group. 
6. Rule 1.9(b) provides that a lawyer cannot use information obtained in the former 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of that former client, unless the 
information has become generally known. 
7. Zoll received no confidential information from Castleton during the Post-Divorce 
Action, the Bankruptcy Action or the Collection Case, which benefited Ricks in the 
subsequent representation against Castleton. 
8. Zoll did not breach any duty of loyalty or confidentiality owed to Mr. Castleton under 
Rule 1.9 or Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
9. The Court concludes as a matter of law that Zoll had nothing to do with the taking of 
additional property by Ricks, the damage to the property while in Rick's possession, 
or the circumstance of Ricks failing to return property that he had agreed to return. 
10. The Court concludes that it was not foreseeable to Zoll that Ricks would not return 
property that he had agreed to return, or that Ricks would damage property in his 
possession. 
11.There is no nexus between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages. 
12.The conduct by Ricks of allegedly causing damage to property and failing to return 
property as agreed, was an independent intervening cause that severed the 
connection between Zoll's conduct and Castleton's claimed damages. 
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13. Castleton has failed to establish any damages directly attributable to Zoll's action. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
1. That the cross claimant Castleton has no cause of action against Zoll. 
2. The Court rules in favor of Zoll on all issues before the Court. 
3. The issue of attorney's fees is reserved for further determination pursuant 
to the parties' stipulation. 
DATED this Z ^ day of December 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form 
FRA 
District 
JOHN T. ANDERSON, 
Attorney for defendants Castleton and 
ABACO Publishing and ABACO Installers 
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NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON, 
Defendant and Crossclaim Plaintiff, 
v. 
B. RAY ZOLL, 
Defendant and Crossclaim 
Defendant. 
ORDER REGARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Civil No. 960905028 
Judee Frank G. Noel 
On December 20, 1999, the Court made and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order (collectively "Initial Order"). The Initial Order stated, among other things, that 
the issue of the parties' claims for attorney's fees would be resolved later through the submission 
of motions, memoranda and affidavits. On February 16, 2000, Defendant and Cross-Claim 
Defendant, B. Ray Zoll ("ZolT), filed his motion for attorney's fees ("Attorney's Fees Motion") 
against Defendant and Cross-Claim Plaintiff, Douglas Castleton ("Castleton"). Castleton 
submitted papers in opposition to Zoll's Attorney's Fees Motion, and on April 21, 2000, the 
Court conducted oral argument on the Attorney's Fees Motion. The Court having read and 
considered the parties' memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, Zoll's Attorney's Fees 
Motion, having heard and considered the arguments, representations and stipulations of counsel, 
having advised the parties' counsel of its decision to deny the Motion, and good cause appealing 
for the entry of an order formally embodying the same, it is hereby 
ORDERED that Zoll's Attorney's Fee Motion shall be, and hereby is, denied. 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
John T>Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Claim Plaintiff 
Steven C. Tycksen 
Attorneys for Defendant/Cross-Claim Defendant 
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Doug Castlcton's Tape 
(transcribed July 26,1996) 
Zoll: Allrighl Doug, I just want, I want h to get dean here, okay. 1 want to clean this 
deal up. Right now, I'm recording us, record this little conversation. This is your chance 
to try to make due with what appears to me to be a really sensitive, ugly, little situation. 
r ve just shown you these billings, like the Publisher's Assistant. Did you make that thing 
up off your computer and pad it? 
Castleton: Yes I did. 
ZoD: And you padded h and sent it over to Nathan? 
Castleton: It's for labor that I did but Publisher's Assistant didn't do it. 
Zoll: So then you would have, then you would give this to Rhonda. Is there even such a 
thing as Publisher's Assistant? 
Castleton: No. 
Zoll So, you made up that letterhead? 
Castleton: Yes. 
Zoll: And then you went ahead after you made the letterhead up and you put your work 
in and you figured that you did do this, for example under this Publisher's Assistant 6,000 
trim LifePack? You billed it at 15 cents yourself and billed $900.00? 
Castleton* Yes. 
Zoll And you got paid for that? 
Cistlfton. Yes. 
Zoll You knew you were getting paid for that? 
Castleton: Yes. 
Zoll: At the same time you were getting paid a salary from Nathan? 
Castleton: Yes. 
Zoll So you knew you were double dipping there? 
/ 
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Castleton: Yes. 
Zoll: Why did you do it Doug? 
Castleton: Just didn't have enough money to make the ends meet. 
ZoD: Pressure from your ex? 
Castleton: (inaudible) 
Zoll: Pressure from Suzette? 
Ricks: Suzanne. 
Zoll: Suzanne? Did the same thing happen on most of the invoices thai you went 
through? Were they padded too? 
Castleton: (inaudible) They were (?) 
Zoll: For example Replicolor Did you make up an invoice for Replicolor too? 
Castleton: Yeah, I did. 
Zoll: So you wouid actually put down the hems for description then you would show 
the price and then you would just... 
Ricks: So, how much did you pad these things on average? 
Castleton: I don't know. 
Ricks: So whatever you thought you could get away with or whatever you needed? 
Castleton. 1 don't know (inaudible) 
Zcll: I can't, I'm sorry, I can't hear you Doug. 
Castleton: I really didn't use a rule of thumb. 
Zoll: Just if you needed a little extra money you padded some of it? 
Castleton* I did. 
Zoll: You know I represent Nathan in this situation I guess don't you? 
Castleton Are you representing me too? 
Zoll: I represented you in your divorce. I have nothing to do with that in this case. 
Castleton: Well I just want to make it right so... 
ZoD: Are you willing to try to make this thing right? 
Castleton: Yes. 
Zoll: You realize that this is criminal conduct? 
Castleton: No I didn't realize it 
Zoll: When you actually make up an invoice, Doug? 
Castleton: I thought a designer could charge a surcharge on these expenses 
Zoll: But you surcharge by making up a whole invoice, even based off a company that 
doesn't exist? 
Castleton: I did and I screwed up. 
Zoll: And this is a guy that was trying to take care of you Doug. If you just asked him 
for some raises instead, along the way you would have probably got them. You didn't 
have to do this. 
Castleton: Well I was just trying to make it come up to some level where the royalties 
were going to be what we first talked about this thing. So... 
Zoll: How iong did you do it? Did you do it...I've got invoices going back, it looks like, 
to August of 95 
Castleton: I may have done some back to June. 
Zoll June of 1995^ 
Castleton: Yeah, (inaudible) 
Zoll: How did you handle the mileage? Were you padding the miles? 
Castleton: No I didn't pad miles If you want to check my odometer right now, it will 
add up 
Zoll. So you just billed it straight through? It just surprises me I see, like for example, 
you're going along in April and March you're about 3,4. 500 miles and then they jump up 
to 2,000 miles. 
Castleton: You got to look at what we were doing during those months and where I 
was going. A lot of the months when I, when we do the film and there's a lot of running 
around between dowmown and the place and Provo. The miles just add up. I didn't pad 
the miles. 
Zoll: You were working, were you doing fide deals, working side, besides working on 
Nathan's projects? 
Castleton. I did one project for one company called Srnartcom but I didn't get paid on 
that. 
Zoll: So, you spent ail your efforts on Nathan's work then? Is that right? 
Ricks: So, did you do any Act! consulting during that time? 
Castleton: I did three sessions total. Everything else I've been giving to Rhonda's 
husband to do. 
Zoll: What about your IDN "Real Opportunity of a Lifetime** 
Castleton: It was all billed on my bills and I haven't passed through any cost on to 
Nathan. 
Zoll: You didn't pass through any cost to Nathan on the book? 
Castleton: No. 
Zoll. How do you tell? I mean are you saying that you billed... 
Castleton. Well I can show you the invoice that I incurred on it from Replicolor. 
Ricks I've got a question for you If we're working together and you know all my 
thoughts and everything I'm wortang on and all my projects and everything and you know 
v/hat my business is and we've got this arrangement, then how do you come out with your 
own damn book on my time? That I've never seen, nor heard of? 
Castleton: I just didn't think that that was something that you'd be interested in. 
Ricks. And how could you, how could you. when I tell you okay I'm going to give you 
10% of the business and then obviously you're making so damn much more money 
scamming me. doing your markups on your fcke invoices and so forth, you come out and 
print your book and go in competition with me Don't you see a little bit of conflict of 
interest there? 
Castleton. Yeah but that's one of the reasons that I haven't sold any books Nate. 
Kicks: I mean, how do you rationalize that? 
Castleton: I've sold ten books and those were to Sue. 
Ricks: And it's not that you haven't tried to sell them 
Castleton: I honestly haven't actively gone out and tried to sell them. 
Ricks: So why would you go incur a S17,CO0 bill for books that you decided that you 
weren't going to sell? 
Castleton: I know, I wanted to talk to you about this. 
Ricks: Oh you figured since they weren't seDing you'd come talk to me and see if I 
wanted to buy them all and do a project like this so you could get out of? 
Castleton: MmHmm (Yes) 
Ricks; Yeah, I'm soiry I don't buy it. 
ZoB: What about the, how did the, with, what is it that, tell me what Nathan obtained or 
purchased in the form of computers, equipment and software? Do you have any kind of a 
list of all of that* 
Casileton- I can get them off of the invoices 
Ricks. Where are all of the rest of the invoices? 
Castleton: I've almost got them all finished 
ZoU: Are they there at your apartment? 
Castleton MmHmm (inaudible) 
Zoll: Well let me tell you what, what we, what I think we should do. I'll go off. 
Recorder turned off 
Zoll That was the meeting with Nathan Ricks, Ray Zoll and Doug Castleton on April 
the 9th, 1996 at 7.30 pm 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE RODERICK, 
Plaintiff, 
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN 
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CROSS-CLAIM OF DEFENDANT 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON 
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANTS, 
NATHAN RICKS AND B. RAY 
ZOLL 
Civil No. 960905028 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant Douglas T. Castleton ("Castleton") hereby cross-claims against defendants 
Nathan Ricks ("Ricks") and B. Ray Zoll ("ZoU"), and seeks relief as follows: 
I. 
IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES 
1. Castleton is, and at all times material to this action was, a resident of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
2. Ricks is, and at all times material to this action was, a resident of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
3. Zoll is, and at all times material to this action was, a resident of Salt Lake 
County, Utah and an attorney licensed to practice law in all courts of the state of Utah. 
II. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This court has jurisdiction over the claims in this cross-claim pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) and Utah R. Civ. P 13(f). 
5. Venue properly lies in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7. 
in . 
FACTS 
6. In late 1994, Ricks retained Castleton to produce certain sales aids and training 
materials for Ricks' use and benefit as a distributor for NuSkin International ("NuSkin"). 
7. Between late 1994 and early 1996, Ricks and Castleton reached several 
agreements (collectively "Agreement") to assure that Castleton was fairly compensated for work 
he performed on behalf of Ricks and Ricks' company, N.S. Group. Under the Agreement, 
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Ricks agreed to (a) pay Castleton base compensation at the rate of $2,500 per month, (b) pay 
Castleton an initial royalty of fifty cents ($.50) (later increased to $1) for every HeadStart 
manual that Ricks sold to his customers, and (c) pay Castleton ten percent (10%) of the annual 
net profits earned by N.S. Group. 
8. From the inception of the parties' relationship, generally, and the consummation 
of the Agreement, specifically, Ricks was chronically delinquent in his payment of compensation 
that Castleton had earned under the Agreement. In an effort to assure that he received the 
compensation to which he was entitled to under the Agreement (but which he feared Ricks would 
never pay), Castleton began preparing and presenting to Ricks invoices (collectively "Invoices") 
for reimbursement of claimed out-of-pocket expenses that exceeded the amounts that Castleton 
had actually incurred. 
9. In the meantime, Castleton was embroiled in a protracted divorce and post-divorce 
proceeding that he had initiated against his then-wife, Pamela Castleton, in 1992 ("Divorce 
Case"). Zoll served continuously as Castleton's legal counsel in the Divorce Case from January 
1994 to November 22, 1996 when Zoll filed his notice of withdrawal. During the course of the 
Divorce Case, Castleton entrusted Zoll with extensive confidential information regarding 
Castleton's assets, income, liabilities and other personal financial information. 
10. Zoll also served as Castleton's legal counsel during the summer of 1994 in a 
bankruptcy case ("Bankruptcy Case") involving the distribution of proceeds from a trustee's sale. 
11. On April 8, 1996, Zoll contacted Castleton and asked him to appear at his office 
at 5:30 that evening. Zoll gave Castleton no advance notice of the contemplated purpose of the 
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meeting. When Castleton appeared at Zoll's office at the scheduled time, Castleton was 
surprised to see that Ricks was present with Zoll. At that point, Zoll angrily informed Castleton 
- his own client in the ongoing Divorce Case and the concluded Bankruptcy Case -- that Zoll 
was now serving as legal counsel for Ricks in connection with concerns that Ricks had about the 
Invoices that Castleton had previously submitted. Shocked and dismayed that his own lawyer 
was proposing to take a position adverse to him, Castleton objected to Zoll's simultaneous 
representation of Ricks. Zoll responded that, under the circumstances, he was fully justified and 
entitled to represent Ricks in his claims against Castleton. 
12. Zoll and Ricks then angrily presented Castleton with the Invoices and demanded 
that Castleton confirm that the Invoices had been marked up. When Castleton conceded that 
they were, Zoll told Castleton that he had committed a felony for which he could be immediately 
arrested by the police and taken to jail. Zoll and Ricks repeatedly threatened Castleton that if 
he did not make immediate restitution to Ricks, they would have him arrested, criminally 
prosecuted, and jailed. The specter of his own lawyer angrily threatening to have him criminally 
prosecuted and jailed was terrifying to Castleton and rendered him incapable of rationally 
determining how to respond to Zoll's and Ricks' repeated demands to make restitution to Ricks. 
13. Zoll and Ricks then threatened Castleton that if he did not immediately accompany 
Ricks to Castleton's apartment and turn over certain proprietary information that was contained 
in Castleton's computers, Zoll and Ricks would immediately call the police to have Castleton 
arrested and charged with a felony. Fearful that Zoll and Ricks would carry-out their threats 
if he refused to cooperate, Castleton allowed Ricks and Ricks' brother-in-law, Blake Tillotson 
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("Tillotson"), to accompany him to his apartment where the computers were located. When they 
arrived at Castleton's apartment, Ricks and Tillotson began removing computer cables from 
power sources, disassembling computers and printers, and removing and boxing-up printers, 
scanners, fax machines, telephones, software disks and the like. Ricks and Tillotson then 
proceeded to the living room of Castleton's apartment and removed and took possession of 
Castleton's entire CD collection, stereo, television, laser disk collection, and telephone. They 
then proceeded to Castleton's bedroom and removed a television set that Castleton protested he 
had purchased for his young children. Ricks and Tillotson also removed and took possession 
of other telephones, a microwave oven from the kitchen, an entire drawer from a filing cabinet, 
extra paper, printer cartridges, and other miscellaneous items that Castleton owned. All of the 
foregoing items of personal property are referred to hereafter as the "Property." 
14. At several points throughout this nightmarish ordeal, Castleton told Ricks that 
Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick") had an ownership and security interest in much of the Property 
and that Ricks' forcible seizure and removal of the Property was and would be in derogation of 
the rights of Roderick and other individuals who had security interests in the Property. 
Undeterred, Ricks and Tillotson loaded the Property in their automobiles and Ricks told 
Castleton that now that he had possession of the Property, he and Zoll would soon tell him what 
further action he needed to take to assure that no criminal charges were filed. The next 
morning, Zoll telephoned Castleton and told him to remain in his apartment and not to leave 
without further instructions from Zoll. 
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15- On April 19, 1996, Zoll summoned Castleton to a meeting with Ricks at Zoll's 
office. After repeatedly reminding Castleton that he would be subjected to criminal prosecution 
if he did not cooperate, and telling him he had to get Roderick to release her security interests 
in the Property, Zoll and Ricks "proposed" a global settlement of Ricks' and Roderick's 
competing claims to the Property. Zoll then prepared a written settlement agreement 
("Settlement Agreement") which he instructed Castleton - his own client - to immediately sign 
or face criminal prosecution. At that point, Castleton asked for an opportunity to take the 
proposed Settlement Agreement to a lawyer for review and counsel. Zoll became enraged and 
instructed Castleton to immediately sign the Agreement "or else." Fearful that he would be 
jailed and criminally charged if he did not comply with ZoU's and Ricks' demands, Castleton 
reluctantly signed the Settlement Agreement. After doing so, Castleton asked for a copy of the 
Settlement Agreement, but Zoll refused to comply. 
16. During the next few days, Zoll attempted to negotiate a resolution of Roderick's 
claims against the Property. On April 22, 1996, Zoll left a voice mail message with Castleton 
which stated: 
Looks like things are working out positively here. We've got to 
work out a couple more terms. I think we've got it working with 
[Roderick] and we're probably going to let you survive all this. 
17. During the next several weeks, Castleton repeatedly begged Zoll and Ricks to 
return several items of the Property, including three computers, printers and a fax machine to 
enable Castleton to perform design and other work for other clients and customers for whom he 
H13cros.l5a 6 
had contracted to work. Zoll and Ricks, however, failed and refused to do so, effectively 
putting Castleton out of business. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Contract: Ricks) 
through 17 above. 
19. Ricks has failed and refused to perform any of the payment obligations imposed 
upon him oy the Agreement described in paragraph 7 above. His failure to do so constitutes a 
material and unexcusable breach of the Agreement. 
20. • • . - ^* > has 
suffered injury and damages of a character and in an amount to be established at trial. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Conversion: Ricks) 
21. Castleton incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
t.-i; .uk*r **•• e . 
22. Ricks' willful, coercive, aiid otherwise improper seizure and removal of the 
Property from Castleton constitutes an intentional conversion of the Property. 
23. At the time of its seizure and removal, the Property had a reasonable fair market 
value of at least $40,000. 
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24. As a direct and proximate result of Ricks' conversion of the Property, Castleton 
has suffered injury and damages in the amount of at least $40,000, plus interest and lost business 
income in an amount to be established at trial. 
25. Ricks' conduct has been willful and/or in reckless disregard of Castleton's rights 
in and to the Property, thereby justifying the imposition of punitive damages in an amount equal 
to at least three hundred percent (300%) of all proven compensatory damages. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Rescission of Settlement Agreement: Ricks) 
26. Castleton incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 25 above. 
27. Ricks' execution of the Settlement Agreement was coercively procured by a series 
of extortionate threats to have Castleton criminally charged, jailed and prosecuted. 
28. Under these circumstances, the Settlement Agreement is voidable and Castleton 
is entitled to an order rescinding the Settlement Agreement, directing Ricks to immediately 
return the Property to Castleton, and requiring Ricks to compensate Castleton for the value of 
his loss of use of the Property. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Zoll) 
29. Castleton incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 28 above. 
1113cros 15a 8 
30. As Castleton's lawyer in the Divorce Case and the Bankruptcy Case, Zoll owed 
Castleton an unqualified fiduciary duty of loyalty, due care, and good faith and fair dealing. 
3 1 . Through the conduct alleged in this Cross-Claim, Zoll has breached his fiduciary 
duty to Castleton, as a direct and proximate result of which Castleton has suffered injury and 
damages of a charactei and in an amoi int to be established at trial • '••••' • 
32. Zoll's conduct has been willful and/or in reckless disregard of Castleton's rights 
in and in lhe hopn( \ , (hneirv fiisiih tiif llic IIII|MIMIIIin nil ipiiiiili11 damages in an imounl u|iiiil 
to at least three hundred percent (300%) of all proven compensatory damages. 
WHEREFORE, Castleton demands judgment against Ricks and Zoll as follows: 
A . On his first claim foi it/lief against Ricks loi 
1. Damages of a character and in an amount to be established at trial; 
2 . • • Attornej "s fees, inter est and costs as p ro \ icieci b j law ; and . • 
3 . Such other and further relief as the court deems just . 
B . On his second claim for relief against Ricks for: 
1. Damages for loss of the Property in the principal amount of at least 
$40 ,000 , plus lost business income in an amount to be established at trial; 
2 . himiivi ildimijit". in .in .iiiiiuiiiil u|iiiil In ill icasl lima, ihijiidieti pen nit 
(300%) of all proven compensatory damages ; 
3 . At to rney ' s fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and 
4 . Such other and further relief as the court deems jus t . 
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C. On his third claim for relief against Ricks for: 
1. An order rescinding the Settlement Agreement, directing Ricks to 
immediately return the Property to Castleton, and requiring Ricks to compensate 
Castleton for the value of his loss of use of the Property; 
2. Attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and 
3. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
D. On his fourth claim for relief against Zoll for: 
1. Damages of a character and in an amount to be established at trial; 
2. Punitive damages in an amount equal to at least three hundred percent 
(300%) of all proven compensatory damages; 
3. Attorney's fees, interest and costs as provided by law; and 
4. Such other and further relief as the court deems just. 
DATED this / ? ' day of November, 1997. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John H Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. 
Castleton, ABACO Publishing, and 
ABACO Installers 
lU3cros 15a 10 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / f day of November, 1997, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing I ross I laim ml I hi Iniitl.iiil Pi II|»LII I  ( iislklon "\ i jiiisi I <»• 
Defendants, Nathan Ricks and B. Ray Zoll to be mailed, via first-class, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
B. Ray Zoll, Esq. 
Peter M. De Jonge, Esq. 
Zoll & Branch 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Richard R. Golden, Esq. 
Mclntyre, Golden, Horgas & ) ha/ 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 




I hi \greemen tgreement") is made and entered into this 
day of August, 1999 by and among (i) Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick"), (ii) Douglas T. 
Castleton ("Castleton"), ABACO Publishing, a Utah limited liability company, and ABACO 
Installers a 1 liah Entities"), and (iii) Nathan 
Ricks ("Ricks") and N.S. Group, a Utah general partnership ("NSG"). 
R E C I T A L S 
A. ,M acquired and were 
the joint owners of numerous items of personal property, including stereo and television 
equipment, a substantial collection of laser discs, computer discs, and compact discs 
(collectively "Roderick and Castleton Property"* hiiMiii1 tluii .unit: time ptMi'ui Castleton 
acquired and was the owner of certain computer equipment, peripheral equipment, software, 
mobile telephones, a microwave oven, printer cartridges, and other miscellaneous items 
(collectively "Castleton Property"). 
B. On April 8, 1996, Ricks, after meeting with his lawye:, ^. Ray Zoll ("Zoll"), 
b% = "asiletoij, si-imi ilr Roderick and Castleton Property and the Castleton Property as an 
offset against, or as security for, a debt that Ricks claimed Castleton nwni mm .mil NSG in 
connection with Castleton's independent contractor relationship with Ricks and NSG 
("Independent Conti actor Relatioi i sh ip"). 
C. - Pursuant to that certain Notice of Termination 1996 
("Termination Notice"), Zoll notified Castleton in pertinent part that: 
Pursuant to our understanding and as you have consented we have 
picked up and caused to be delivered to [NSG] offices certain 
equipment, files, software, furnishings and the like from your 
apartment to be held by [NSG] offices pending our further 
investigation of the amount of money that has been 
inappropriately obtained by you. 
D. At various times after April 8, 1996, Ricks and NSG returned a few items of the 
Roderick and Castleton Property and the Castleton Property, much of which was damaged, 
missing integral component parts, and/or deteriorated through use. As of the date of this 
Agreement, however, neither Ricks, NSG, nor ZoU has returned all of the Roderick and 
Castleton Property and the Castleton Property (collectively "Unreturned Property"). 
E. In April 1996, Zoll drafted a written settlement agreement ("Settlement 
Agreement") which Ricks, NSG, Castleton and the ABACO Entities signed on April 18, 1996. 
The Settlement Agreement states in pertinent part: 
Certain property equipment is being held by N.S. Group and/or 
its bailee Nathan Ricks to secure claims of N.S. Group against 
Castleton. Said property was consensually given to Ricks for 
security purposes and is being held by agreement pending 
execution of this Agreement. 
F. In July 1996, Roderick filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah a verified complaint ("Roderick Complaint") captioned Suzanne Roderick v. 
Nathan Ricks, et al.. Civil No. 960905028 ("Case"). The Roderick Complaint asserted and 
asserts several claims for relief against Ricks, Zoll, and several unidentified John Doe 
defendants for their alleged seizure, removal, conversion and/or destruction of Roderick's 
interest in the Roderick and Castleton Property and for tortious interference with Roderick's 
contractual relationships with Castleton. Ricks and NSG deny that they are liable to Roderick 
for any of the claims in the Roderick Complaint. 
G. • In November !*>%, Ricks iiinl Zoll filed .i i, nmiinckuin i Ritks < nijiiinmh-itjii") 
in the Case against Roderick for allegedly colluding with her lawyer, Richard Golden, to 
extortionately induce Castleton to grant Roderick certain security interests against the Roderick 
and Castleton Property and the Castleton Property. Rodent k drnirs thiii she is liable, m Kicks 
for any of the claims in the Ricks Counterclaim. 
H. November 1996, Ricks filed a cross-claim in the Case against Castleton 
and the ABACO Entities ("Ricks Cross-Claim") asserting claiir* 
unjust enrichment. Castleton and the ABACO Entities deny that they are liable to Ricks for 
iiii'i \>\ llir claims in iIn: HiL'k'i 4 ".innterclaim. . ..'••/•••'.•... 
L In November 1997, Castleton filed a cross-claim in the Case against Ricks and 
Zoll ("Castleton Cross-Claim"), asserting three claims for relief against Ricks and one claim 
hv iflirl jganis1 "V111 Huls. lni»r>, ttui l,i , "ul'li" tv i astleton for any of the claims asserted 
against him in the Castleton Cross-Claim. 
J. In about July 1999, Zoll claimed for the first time that he and Ricks previously 
had entered into Jin Hurmneni i ",* liqinl ("t>i>|><;iainHI mid IrulminiiY Agreement") under which 
Ricks committed to indemnify and hold Zoll harmless from any liability that may be imposed 
on Zoll through claims asserted by Roderick and/or Castleton. Ricks denies that he ever 
reached the Alleged Cooperation and Indeminf ' Vgreernt ni with \ ''.oil and cerufie, ilo Roderick 
and Castleton that he is unaware of any basis for ZolTs claim that such an Agreement was ever 
reached. 
K. The parties desire to resolve all disputes between them in connection with the 
Case, and to do so with a full reservation of all rights that they have or may have against Zoll 
in the Case, and hereby do so on the following terms and conditions: 
AGREEMENT 
1. Delivery of Unreturned Property. Before or at the time he executes this 
Agreement, Ricks, on behalf of himself and NSG, shall exercise his best efforts to locate and 
return to Roderick and Castleton all of the Unreturned Property that is currently in their 
possession or under their control ("Returned Property"). 
2. Payment of Settlement Amount. At the time he executes this Agreement, Ricks, 
on behalf of himself and NSG, shall pay to Roderick the sum of $5,000 ("Payment"). 
3. Mutual Rescission of April 1996 Settlement Agreement. The parties' Settlement 
Agreement dated April 18, 1996 shall be and it hereby is deemed rescinded, extinguished, and 
void ab initio. 
4. Dismissal of Portions of Case. Concurrently with Ricks' and NSG's delivery of 
the Returned Property and the Payment, the parties shall cause their respective legal counsel to 
execute the stipulation and joint motion for order of partial dismissal with prejudice in the form 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. Limited Indemnification of Ricks bv Roderick and Castleton. With the 
exception of any damages that may be incurred or assessed as a result of any claim that Zoll 
might make under the Alleged Cooperation and Indemnity Agreement, Roderick, Castleton, 
and the ABACO Entities hereby indemmfy Ricks and NSG against any damages that may be 
incurred as a iesult of any other claim that Zoll might make against Ricks ana i\ v or 
indemnification or contribution arising out of or relating to: the Ricks and Castleton Property, 
tin 1 asilch MI I ""i open \ if In Independent Contractor Relationship, the Case, the Roderick 
Complaint, the Ricks Cross-Claim, or the Castleton Cross-Claim. 
6. Full Release bv Roderick. Castleton and the ABACO Entities of Ricks and 
N;MJ W, •••• •"•M,;^ ...- •-.. imposed IIIn iimI Ihr iiiiifjlitf" iflamed inula llir Agreement, 
Roderick, Castleton, and the ABACO Entities, for themselves, their heirs, personal 
representatives, agents and employees, hereby release Ricks, NSG (and NSG's corporate 
claims, demands, actions or liabilities of any kind, known or unknown, now oi hereafter 
arising in connection with, or in any way relating to, the Roderick and Castleton Property, the 
Castlet* - • Relationship llic I dsv il I ic Rodern :k 
Complaint, the Ricks Cross-Claim, the Castleton Cross-Claim, and the Alleged Cooperation 
and Indemnity Agreement. 
7. Full Release bv Ricks and NSG of Roderick and Castleton. Other than the 
obligations imposed by and the rights retained under this Agreement, Ricks and NSG, for 
themsei-,-•. theii hen s, pei sonal i: epresentatives, agents and employees, hereby release 
Roderick, Castleton, and the ABACO Entities (and the ABACO Entities' corporate affiliates, 
parents, subsidiaries, partners, officers, agents, and employees) from any and all claims, 
demands, actions or liabilities of any kind, known or unknown, now or hereafter arising in 
connection with, or in any way relating to, the Roderick and Castleton Property, the Castleton 
Property, the Independent Contractor Relationship, the Case, the Roderick Complaint, the 
Ricks Cross-Claim, the Castleton Cross-Claim, and the Alleged Cooperation and Indemnity 
Agreement. 
8. Full Reservation of Rights against Zoll. It is expressly understood and agreed 
that the settlement embodied by this Agreement is and shall be without prejudice to the rights 
of Roderick, Castleton and the ABACO Entities to pursue all available claims in the Case 
against Zoll, and Roderick and Castleton hereby reserve their rights to do so. 
9. Ownership of Claims. The parties acknowledge, declare, represent and warrant 
that they have not heretofore assigned, transferred or hypothecated, or purported to assign, 
transfer or hypothecate, to any third person or entity, any liability, claim, demand, action, 
cause of action, or right released or discharged in this Agreement. 
10. Attorney's Fees. In the event of any defaults in any obligations imposed by this 
Agreement, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or occur from enforcing this Agreement, or any part hereof, or 
in pursuit of any remedy provided hereunder or by law, whether such remedy is pursued by 
filing a suit or otherwise. 
11. Non-Reliance. This Agreement is executed without reliance upon any 
statement, representation, promise, inducement, understanding, or agreement by, or on behalf 
of, any representative, agent, servant, employee, attorney, or other person employed by any of 
the parties, other than the promises, agreements, and commitments set forth in the foregoing 
Recitals and in this Agreement. 
12. Compromise of a Disputed Claim. The parties understand and agree that this 
Agreement is a compromise of disputed claims and defenses and shall not be construed as an 
lUlnnssion 01 com rssiuui nl h nihility h\ .IIIP'I i Hit |MI lie .ill nil n bnn v \pirssh iien\ Jim mil 
all liability whatsoever. 
13. Choice of Laws. This Agreement shall be construed pursuant to the laws of the 
! iiiiie ol Utah. 
14. Entire Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement embody and reflect the 
entire understanding of the parties and there are no representations, warranties or undertakings 
:fMn those expressed and stil inrih ill llii". Agreement and,, in the < ai ious exh ibits tc ill is 
Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be modified or amended in any way 
except by writing signed by all parties. 
15. Authority to Execute. Each party signing this Agreement and each part} on 
whose behalf each party signs this Agreement warrants that he or it is duly authorized to enter 
inii i jjnd I'xeuuk llir V i^trtrincml • . •' • • . 
16. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement shall bind and inure to the benefit of 
each party hereto and each party's predecessors, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, assigns, 
luiliiiT, limilcil fMitiKT* apnih nfliirp Hiiplovtvs sIi<iii?lioidt'is assiii unci It'^al 
representatives, insurance carriers, sureties and representatives, heirs, executors, and/or 
administrators. 
17. Partial Invalidity. If any term or provision of this Agreement shall be held 
invalid or unenforceable, the remaining terms and conditions of the Agreement shall not be 
affected thereby, but each such term and provision shall be valid and enforced to the fullest 
extent permitted by law. 
18. Notices and Deliveries. All notices and deliveries contemplated by this 
Agreement shall be given or delivered to the following addresses: 
If to Roderick: 
If to Castleton and the ABACO Entities: 
Richard R. Golden 
Mclntyre & Golden 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 
Murray, Utah 84107 
John T. Anderson 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2006 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Durham, Evans, Jones & Pinegar 
50 South Main Street, Suite 850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
19. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same 
force and effect as if executed in one complete document. However, there is no effective 
agreement until each of the parties hereto has executed at least one counterpart. 
If to Ricks and NSG: 
. _ \ 





ABACO PUBLISfflNG, I K ' 
B> 
\ Douglas Y. Castletqn 
"Its Managing Member 
ABACO INSTALLERS, LLC 
By 
/-
4 ^ - L\*
 f
 ^ L X C ^ _ . _ 
Douglas T. Castleton 




Its General Partner 
n 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
-John T. Anderson (#0094) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton, 
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability 
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES 
I-X; 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND JOINT MOTION 
FOR ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE OF (i) PLAINTD7FS 
COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
RICKS, (ii) DEFENDANT RICKS' 
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF, 
(iii) DEFENDANT CASTLETON'S CROSS-
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT RICKS, 
AND (iv) DEFENDANT RICKS' CROSS-
CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
CASTLETON AND ABACO ENTITIES 
Civil No. 960905028 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
Plaintiff Suzanne Roderick ("Roderick"), through her undersigned counsel, defendant 
Douglas T. Castleton ("Castleton"), ABACO Publishing and ABACO Installers (collectively 
"ABACO Entities"), through their undersigned counsel, and defendant Nathan Ricks 
("Ricks"), through his undersigned counsel, hereby stipulate and jointly move for the entry of 
an order (i) dismissing with prejudice, as against Ricks, Roderick's verified complaint dated 
EXHIB! JT 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plainti) complaint dated Julj 11 1996 shall I  K i i i icl it I  ten el n is 
dismissed with prejudice as against defendant Nathan Ricks. 
2 . Defendant Ricks' counterclaim dated November 19. 1996 shall be, and it hereby 
is dismissed w illli piqiiidn/e. ' • . . 
3 . The cross-claim of defendant and cross-claim plaintiff Douglas 1. Castleton 
dated November 18. 1997 shall be, and it hereby is, dismissed with prejudice as against 
defendant and cross-claim defendant Nathan Ricks. 
4 . The cross-claim of defendant and cross-claim plaintiff Nathan Ricks dated 
November 18 1996 shall be, and it hereby is dismissed with prejudice as against defendant 
and cross-claim defendant Douglas T. Castleton, ABACO Publishing and ABACO Installers. 
5. Each of the parties shall bear its own attorney's fees and costs. 
6. nissal '.liiilll mil hinil HI ill <iih HWiiiin alteu I hi lights of 
plaintiff or defendants Castleton, ABACO Publishing and ABACO Installers to assert all 
available claims for relief against defendant B. Ray Zoll in this case. 
• D A T E D th is da> if \ I igust. 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Frank G. Noel 
Third District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN 
Richard R. Golden 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Ricks 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton, 
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson (#0094) 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton, 
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SiAII 1)1 ITAH 
SUZANNE RODERICK, ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
) PREJUDICE OF (i) PLAINTIFF'S 
Plaintiff, ) COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT 
) RICKS, (u) DEFENDANT RICKS' 
v. ) COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST 
) PLAINTIFF, (iii) DEFENDANT 
NATHAN RICKS; B. RAY ZOLL; ) CASTLETON'S CROSS-CLAIM 
DOUGLAS T. CASTLETON; ABACO ) AGAINST DEFENDANT RICKS, AND 
PUBLISHING, a Utah limited liability ) (iv) DEFENDANT RICKS' CROSS-
company; ABACO INSTALLERS, a Utah ) CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
limited liability company; and JOHN DOES CASTLETON AND ABACO ENTITIES 
I-X; 
) Civil No. 960905028 
Defendants. ) Judge Frank G. Noel 
The court having read and considered the parties' Stipulation and Joint Motion for 
Order of Dismissal With Prejudice of (i) Plaintiff's Complaint Against Defendant Ricks, (ii) 
Defendant Ricks' Counterclaim Against Plaintiff, (iii) Defendant Castleton's Cross-Claim 
Against Defendant Ricks and (iv) Defendant Ricks' Cross-Claim Against Defendants Castleton 
aiv, \B-M\) liniitu^ ami L'OIHI caust. appearing ihetclm ti i* Hereby 
July 11, 1986, (ii) dismissing with prejudice Ricks' counterclaim against Roderick dated 
November 18, 1996, (iii) dismissing with prejudice Ricks' cross-claim against Castleton and 
the ABACO Entities dated November 18, 1996, and (iv) dismissing with prejudice as against 
Ricks Castleton's cross-claim dated November 18, 1997. This stipulation and joint motion are 
made without prejudice to the rights of Roderick, Castleton and the ABACO Entities to 
continue to assert and prosecute their claims in this case against defendant B. Ray Zoll. 
DATED this day of August, 1999. 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN 
Richard R. Golden 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Ricks 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants Douglas T. Castleton, 
ABACO Publishing, and ABACO Installers 
0622snpulation and joint motion 7 
TabF 
B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 






NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
Civil No. 924901543 
JUDGE RQKICH 
Zoll & Branch and B. Ray Zoll, Attorneys for the 
Plaintiff, hereby withdraw as counsel for the above-named 
Plaintiff. 
DATED this 2 2 ^ day of November, 1J396.--
B. Hay/ffoll 
Attdrrfey for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the -^jr* day of November, 
1996, X mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OP 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL in the first-class mail, postage prepaid, to 
Sharon A. Donovan 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84101-2167 
7342 South Lanua Street 
Midvale, UT 84047 
2 
TabG 
July 1, 1994 
RayZoll 
Zoll & Branch 
Re: Response to Affidavit of Pamela Castleton in Response to Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of His 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Dear Ray, 
I AM EXTREMELY DISTRESSED AND DESPONDENT OVER THE STATEMENTS MADE BY 
PAMELA CASTLETON WITHIN HER AFFIDAVIT. These are my thoughts about Pam's responses 
within it: 
My Affidavit: At the present time, Defendant Pamela Castleton is employed at the Old Meeting House 
and earns an income of $700.00 per month. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 4 ofPUuntiffs Affidavit, I am employed at the Old Meeting 
House, however, I earn approximately $500.00 gross per month. My wage is $7.00 per hour and I 
work an average of 15 to 20 hours per week, depending on the events scheduled at the facility in a 
given time period. 
3. She verified to the Court that she was earning $700 per month during the Hearing in June, 1993. 
Now she claims to only earn $500 per month based on 15 to 20 hours per week. 
a. She is gone from the kids during the weekdays much more than 15 to 20 hours (50-60) 
and she also works Saturdays. Where is she going when she leaves the kids so often if it's not to 
work? 
b. She works for her family (her parents own the Old Meetinghouse ("OM")reception 
center) and Jason, my son, has told me how he gets income of his cousin combined and reported 
within his paycheck. His grandma does this because his cousin, although he works at the OM, is 
too young to be employed, so they report his with Jason's gross wages. If they'll manipulate the 
income of their grandsons, I would highly suspect that they would manipulate the income of their 
daughter. 
c. If Pam is only working 15 to 20 hours per week, but can leave the kids to support a 40 
hour work week, why isn't she working 40 hours at $7.00—other than to intentionally under-
employ herself as she accuses me of doing further within the Affidavit? She's claimed that stress 
and having to take care of 5 kids makes her just too tired to work more, but she doesn't take care 
of the kids, leaves them all the time anyway, and the rest of the world can work full time, so buck 
up babe! 
My Affidavit: Since the end of April 1994,1 have been employed at Progressive Installers andl 
currently earn approximately $1,000.00 per month, making 20 percent of gross installation sales. 
Further, 1 have earned an average of$l, 000.00 per month for the past six months. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, my attorney has repeatedly 
requested verification of Plaintiffs income and employment and, to date, it remains unverified 
Accordingly, there is no competent, credible evidence of Plaintiffs income other than his own self-
serving statements. 
4. I don't recall receiving repeated requests for verification of my income and employment other 
than the request that Sharon prepared on June 15, 1994. 
a. This is nothing more than a ploy based on lies to justify the statement that "Accordingly, 
there is no competent, credible evidence of Plaintiffs income other than his own self-serving 
statements." 
b. During the hearing of May and June, 1993, Sharon got the Judge to accept income 
records from 1991 for my corporations (which was gross income to the corporations, not me, but 
also disallowed the expenses of the corporations to offset the income), a year before I was 
PLAINTIFFS 
I EXHIBIT 
divorced. That was when I was at the peak of my income earnings, but sadly, just before the IRS 
shut down the tax savings benefit I was marketing to the trucking industry. Consequently, my 
income dropped dramatically in 1992 and she made a big case of discrediting me, implying to the 
Judge that I was lying about my income, and consequently, the Judge imputed $2,000 per month 
on top of the $2,000 salary I was earning at the time. I believe that this is no more than another 
ploy on Sharon's part to begin painting a picture to the Judge that I am lying about my income 
(again, as they're implying). 
My Affidavit: / have recently undergone a substantial reduction in my income. At the time of the 
divorce
 t1 was making $5,400.00 per month that was later reduced by the Court to impute $4,000.00 per 
month. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I believe that Plaintiff is voluntarily 
under-employed and is not using his best efforts to make the most possible income in order to assist in 
supporting me and our five children. 
5. Being voluntarily under-emploved is an interesting and unique concept, at best, and an outright 
lie, at worst. Not using my best efforts to make the most possible income "in order to assist in supporting 
me and our five children" is supportive of Pam's whole philosophy that she expects me to take care of her 
the rest of her life. 
a. She has no basis to support her belief, other than stating this as a ploy to lure the Judge 
into forming a bad opinion of me and to gain his sympathy for her. 
b. I am working from 7 am to 8 pm and as late as midnight every day, including Saturdays, 
to earn my income. I'm learning a new trade with the hope of establishing a more stable, reliable 
income than I've had over the past 2 years 
c. Pam stated, under oath last year, that she feels that she is entitled to the lifestyle that she 
was accustomed to, but that I am not. Pam fully expects me to earn over $50,000 per year in 
order to net the $23,300 (after FICA, Federal withholding with 1 exemption, and State 
withholding) for the sole purpose of providing the total support she requires each month to 
maintain her exact standard of living. She doesn't expect me to assist her in her support, she 
expects me to be the sole provider of it. 
My Affidavit: Prior to the divorce, I obtained a high school diploma and a year and a half of college, 
and was earning an average of $65,000.00. I was doing quite well as a self-employed tax consultant. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, throughout our marriage, Plaintiff 
was a very hard worker and always earned a comfortable income. It has only been since the divorce 
that Plaintiff allegedly has been unable to continue to earn sufficient income. Plaintiff possesses all 
the skills and ability to continue to earn a comfortable income, however, he is intentionally earning 
less money to avoid his support obligations to me and the children. 
6. Pam is lying again within her Affidavit through her statement that I have "always earned a 
comfortable income." Her statement that "it has only been since the divorce that Plaintiff allegedly has 
been unable to continue to earn a sufficient income" is an outright lie and manipulation of the Court 
through her statements to discredit me, contrary to evidence submitted to the Court last year by me. The 
statement that I am "intentionally earning less money to avoid his support obligations to me and the 
children" is slanderous, unsupported and again, a lie. 
a. I submitted documentation to the Court containing a summary of my earnings 
throughout our marriage. It showed substantially low earnings for the six year period from 1982 
through 1987. This was a very difficult time and certainly not a period of "comfortable income." 
In 1982,1 had my cars repossessed. In 1983, we lost our home and I filed bankruptcy. In 1984, 
my attorney sold us a house on contract that we lost in 1987 because I couldn't afford the 
payments. In 1987, Pam's father bought us a house in Sandy where Pam still resides. It was 
only in 1988, when I was fully employed as a tax consultant to the trucking industry, where I was 
earning a "comfortable income." This income continued until the latter part of 1992 when the 
IRS totally shut down the tax savings benefits that was the sole basis of my consulting income. 
Without the tax consulting opportunity, my earnings were historically low. For her to state that I 
have always earned a comfortable income is another lie and a ploy to discredit me to the Judge. 
My Affidavit: Since suffering the loss of my business and income, I have also suffered the loss of all 
assets, including my furniture, car, and condominium. This resulted in a judgment entered against me in 
the amount of SI 8,000.00 for support arrearage. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 11 ofPlaintiffs Affidavit, it has been Plaintiffs own actions, 
irresponsibility and failure to abide by the orders of the Court which have led to the alleged losses and 
the substantial judgment for child support and alimony being awarded against him. 
10. It has been nothing more than my inability, regardless of my honest, hard-working efforts, to 
earn enough income to pay for my support obligations that caused me the loss of everything I own. Here 
again, they're rendering judgment of me that I'm irresponsible which, again, is a slanderous ploy to taint 
the Court's opinion of me. I testified honestly last May and June 1993 that I had no resources within my 
corporations to earn any income whatsoever. Sharon got the Judge to believe her, but despite that, my 
testimony held to be true as proven by the last year's events. 
My Affidavit: Between June 1993 and December 19931 provided resumes to 40 different companies and 
actively sought employment but was unsuccessful at that time. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, although Plaintiff did apparently 
send resumes to a number of companies, I believe that Plaintiffs actual desire and efforts to obtain 
employment were less than genuine and, again, were effected by his continued desire to take any steps 
necessary to avoid paying child support and take responsibility for his children. 
11. Pam has absolutely no basis to support or determine her belief of my actual desire and efforts to 
obtain employment. Who is she to say that they were genuine or not? Where does she get off with saying 
that I have a continued desire to avoid paying child support? 
a. Even at the contempt hearing on August 17, 1993,1 informed the Judge that I had an 
interview with a prospective employer at 11:00 a.m. who contacted me because someone who I 
had talked to previously about my desire to find employment told him about me and he called me. 
b. Even when I wasn't contacting prospective employers, I was talking with everyone I 
came in contact with so that I could let them know that I was seeking a job. I did this to establish 
a network of people to talk with someone with a hope of word getting to someone who would 
want to hire me. 
c. My efforts to obtain employment were greatly restricted because of two major factors: 1) 
My lack of a college degree; and 2) My income requirements imposed upon me by the Court. I 
require at least $60,000 per year in gross salary in order to fully pay my support obligations of 
$1,941,50 to Pam and provide only $500.00 for me to live on. Most companies require a college 
degree for upper management positions that compensate employees in that high income range. 
d. I was fighting an uphill battle all the time because I was seeking employment that paid 
compensation at over 414 times the average income of a Utahn. Even if I sought a job which 
yielded me with zero dollars to support myself and provide only the money to pay my support 
obligations, I was still requiring compensation at almost 4 times the average income of a Utahn. 
($13,000) 
My Affidavit: On August 17, 1993, when I was feeling the lowest point in my life, the Court sent me to 
the Salt Lake County Jail. At that time, I was harassed and frightened, and this was a humiliating 
experience. The Court then added another S3,162.25 to the support arrearage. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 13 ofPlaintiffs Affidavit, it was Plaintiffs own conduct and 
inability to abide by the orders of the Court that resulted in Plaintiffs incarceration for failure to pay 
support In addition, I was not responsible for having Plaintiff incarcerated. 
12. It's true that I didn't have the ability to pay the support obligations. I hadn't received any money 
for almost two months, hadn't received any unemployment benefits, yet the Court found that my inability 
was intentional, thus I was put in jail. Pam needs to take responsibility for her actions at some point in 
time. It's true that she can't actually sentence me to jail, but without the specific, affirmative actions she 
took to get me to the sentencing, I wouldn't have been sent to jail in the first place. She served me with 
an Order to Show Cause and filed a contempt action against me—not the Court. She testified to the Judge 
and requested him to send me to jail so that I could "learn a lesson." Again, this is a typical "Pam lie" 
that she has signed her name to under oath and penalty of perjury. 
My Affidavit: There have been continual threats and harassment made by the Defendant wherein she 
states she is sending me to jail again. She is using this as a form of control and manipulation to keep me 
from seeing the children. She constantly remarks: "You >e going to jail!" Defendant is also making 
serious remarks about me to the children, which are and attack on my fatherhood. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, it is solely within the discretion 
and power of the Court to incarcerate Plaintiff for his failure to pay support I do not have the power 
nor authority to decide whether or not Plaintiff should be imprisoned for his failure to take 
responsibility for his children. 
13. At least she gets somewhere with this statement. She admits that it's within the discretion and 
power of the court to incarcerate me. She just stops short and doesn't even respond to the allegations I 
make in my statement. The Court doesn't serve me with a motion for contempt—Pam does. And it is this 
continual threat and harassment that she makes against me. Now here we are again, only two months 
later, after going through continued hearings over her last contempt motion drawn out for 3 months where 
the Judge ruled that there was no contempt, she's harassing me with another motion again. 
My Affidavit: The alimony and child support obligations were based on a monthly income of $4,000.00 
but there has been a substantial reduction in my income resulting in a substantial change of 
circumstances since the entry of the Divorce Decree, which was not contemplated at the time of the 
Decree. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I deny than any decrease in 
Plaintiffs income has been anything other than voluntary on his part and it should not be a basis for 
further decrease in his support obligations. 
14. Facts: 
a. $2,000.00 of the $4,000.00 income was based on a salary that I was earning from my 
employment at North American Note Brokers, Inc. I was laid off on June 22, 1993 and lost that 
income. 
b. The additional $2,000.00 income imputed to me by the Court was based on income the 
Court believed I was receiving from my corporations. First, I received no income from the 
corporations because they had already ceased operations at the time of the ruling. Second, I lost 
ownership of all of my corporations through my bankruptcy filed on January 19, 1994. 
c. I have no means of earning the income imputed to me by the Court through resources 
available to me at the time of the hearing last year. This is certainly not voluntary on my part 
and I've had to pursue a whole new trade in an effort to earn a steady income. 
My Affidavit: / am currently unable to pay Defendant the amount originally ordered by this Court even 
though I have been trying. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 17 of Plaintiff s Affidavit, I have received less than $200.00 
in support for five children over the last approximately two months. This does not constitute even a 
good faith effort to attempt to provide even a minimum support for Plaintiffs own children. 
15. Hear again, she's playing the role of judge and jury to determine what a good faith effort on my 
part is. I've paid more than half of what I've earned to her up to this present time: 
a. The computer consulting and book publishing income that I was earning on a self-
employed basis between October 1993 and April 1994 came to a standstill in April. I did not 
make any money in April from services rendered and on April 27, 1994 I was hired by 
Progressive Installers as a carpet installer. 
b. I get paid bi-weekly. Progressive gets paid on its jobs on a bi-weekly basis also. With 
the lag time of Progressive getting paid on its jobs and me getting paid from Progressive, I didn't 
receive my first wages until May 20th in the amount of $142.00. I submitted a payment to ORS 
on May 24th in the amount of $71.00 
c. My next wages were on June 3rd for $382.25. I submitted a payment for health 
insurance premiums to National Casualty in the amount of $114.00 on that same date. I also 
submitted a payment to ORS on June 8th for $110.00. 
Pam conveniently forgets that we couldn't afford a house payment for a whole year in 1986. She 
forgets that we shared one car for 2 years, that I rode my bike to work for that period of time, that 
four of us lived in a small 2 bedroom apartment for VA years, that many times we didn't even 
have money for groceries and relied on our families to feed us, etc., etc., etc. 
b. I was hired by North American Note Brokers in September, 1992 at $24,000 per year. 
This was still considered by Pam to be "insufficient" and that is when she Sharon brought in my 
1991 earnings to the Court in May of 1993 to prove that I should have an additional $2,000 per 
month income imputed to me. I was laid off in June, 1993. In July, 1993,1 filed for 
unemployment and continually sought employment opportunities by sending resumes to 
companies that I felt would benefit from my services. I was not offered an income that would 
provide the monies to support my obligations to Pam and established myself to provide computer 
consulting services on a self-employed basis from September, 1993 through April, 1994. 
Additionally, I pursued an income opportunity through Interior Design Nutritionals, but was 
unsuccessful. I also attempted to supplement my income through publishing and selling a book 
about nutrition to IDN distributors. Throughout this time, I talked to everyone I came in contact 
with about employment opportunities. In February, 1994,1 met Dee Parsons, a carpet installer. I 
told him about my inability to earn a steady income, expressed my dismay about my dilemma and 
stayed in communication with him until April, 1994, he called me to offer me a job with him to 
install carpet. This is certainly not "allegedly" being "unable to continue to earn a sufficient 
income." 
c. Her assertion that I am "intentionally earning less money to avoid his support 
obligations to me and the children" is slanderous, unsubstantiated, and a lie. I've taken 
affirmative action to learn a new trade because the skills that I possess have proven to be 
unmarketable because of the college degree that I am lacking. I work each day to exhaustion in 
order to earn a steady income and am certainly not "intentionally" earning less money and am 
certainly not trying to avoid my support obligations. I'm merely attempting to re-align my 
obligations with my income so that I'm not continually threatened and harassed with contempt 
charges to put me in jail. 
My Affidavit: In September, 1992, my tax consulting business was phased out by the Internal Revenue 
Service. This reduced my income from $65,000.00 per year to zero and has had a damaging effect on my 
pride and efforts. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 8 of Plaintiff7 s Affidavit, although verification has been 
requested, no evidence has ever been provided, other than Plaintiffs own self serving statements that 
his tax consulting business was indeed "phased out9* by the IRS. No competent credible evidence has 
been presented to indicate this decrease in income is anything other than voluntary on Plaintiff s part 
1. How is it that a statement by me made under oath of an Affidavit is a "self-serving" statement, 
but all the allegations made by Pam which are totally unsubstantiated are not? Here again, she is lying 
outright about evidence submitted that the IRS phased out the tax consulting business. 
a. In June, 1990, Pam accompanied me to Washington, D.C. where I attended IRS 
hearings regarding the proposed phase-out of the tax savings I was marketing. She was fully 
aware of the impending elimination of this tax savings area. She read the documents with me 
and we discussed it in full detail. 
b. During the Hearings of May and June, 1993, we submitted both supporting testimony 
from a competitor in the tax consulting business, and documentation from the IRS manuals that 
supported the elimination of this tax savings area. Mr. Les Larson, accountant of Interstate 
Trucking Services, testified under oath that his firm (with which I was previously employed and 
was later a competitor of my tax consulting business) experienced a reduction in employees from 
over 60 to 3 within the time period of 1991 to 1993 as a direct result of the phase-out of the tax 
savings. We submitted copies from the IRS regulations and code manuals that substantiated the 
phase-out of the tax savings area. For her to state that there has been "no competent credible 
evidence...presented to indicate this decrease in income is anything other than voluntary on 
Plaintiffs part" and "no evidence has ever been provided, other than Plaintiffs self-serving 
statements that his tax consulting business was indeed 'phased out' by the IRS" is defamatory, 
contrary to credible evidence submitted to the Court, and again, a blatant attempt to slander me 
to the Court. 
c. Again, her statement that "although verification has been requested" is another 
manipulation to discredit me. The only verification requested was dated on June 15th and this 
Affidavit is dated on June 20th. How can I be expected to comply with the request, submit the 
documentation, and return it to Sharon within 1 day? That was the time period between 
receiving the request and then receiving this Affidavit. 
My Affidavit: In June of 19931 obtained (sought) employment with a series of companies relating to 
the development of a job. At that time I was earning a monthly income of $1,941.41 and my child support 
income was imputed by the Court. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, even at the modification hearing, 
the Court did not find Plaintiffs evidence of income credible and imputed to Plaintiff$4,000.00 per 
month income. Even at this imputed level, Plaintiff has still not desired to pay support payments on a 
timely basis. 
8. This seems to be an attempt to remind the Court that they did not find me to be credible at the 
hearing last year, so the Court should not find me to be credible now. To say that I have not "desired to 
pay support payments on a timely basis" is again, slanderous and without plausible foundation. 
a. Throughout the continued contempt hearings with the Court from February to April, 
1994,1 continually expressed my desire to pay my support payments. However, I also expressed 
my inability to earn the income to provide the full support payments. That is when Judge Rokich 
admonished me to submit a reduction motion to bring my support payments in line with my 
ability to pay. 
b. Who is Pam and Sharon to tell me what my desire is? Who appointed them God with 
the ability to read my mind and tell me what I desire? 
c. The imputed level of $4,000 per month income was excessively high at the time it was 
imputed and, despite my testimony to the Court that I was not earning an additional $2,000 per 
month on top of my salary and did not have any resources within my corporations to provide the 
additional income, provides further support of my inability, rather than my desire to earn less 
than the imputed income level. Besides all of this, I lost my corporation through my bankruptcy 
that the Judge imputed income for me last year. 
My Affidavit: On June 22, 1993,1 lost my title and employment thereto. I then tried to obtain 
unemployment compensation and benefits. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, Plaintiffs own statements about 
his employ ability and desire to obtain employment to his maximum potential are not credible, given 
Plaintiffs history of voluntary underemployment 
9. Where in the world does Pam and Sharon come up with pulling a "history of voluntary under-
employment" out of the air and using it as a basis to base my desire to obtain employment? They've made 
this determination based on their own allegations and are now using it to prove, more or less, that I have 
no desire and am not using my maximum potential. This again is a slanderous ploy to discredit me with 
the Court, without any foundation in truth and actual experience. 
a. I was laid off from my salaried job of $2,000.00 per month with North American Note 
Brokers, Inc. on June 22, 1993. Being totally devastated and scared as to not have any money to 
pay support to Pam, I immediately contacted Job Service to provide monies to pay a portion of the 
obligation. I was told that I would not be eligible for benefits until July. 
b. I filed for unemployment compensation in July. Throughout July and August 1993, Job 
Service reviewed the application, sent out verification to my former employer, and went through 
their process to determine my eligibility. 
c. Finally, in September, 1993,1 began receiving payment of unemployment benefits in the 
amount of $260.00 per week. 
d. I updated and prepared my resume and began sending it to prospective employers. 
d. My next wages were on June 20th for $390.02. I had to purchase parts for my 1986 
Chevy Blazer that had an engine and transmission go out on it in the first week of May that I 
thought was going to cost over $400, but it didn't. I submitted a payment to ORS on July 1st for 
$200.00 
My Affidavit: Thus, I respectively request this Court to grant the Petition to Modify to reduce support 
based on my $1,000.00 per month income. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I deny that any modification of the 
support obligation is appropriate. 
16. No response is necessary to this, other than to point out that I've been put in a deep hole, have 
been trying to climb out, and all she wants to do is keep making the hole bigger so I never will see the 
light of day. 
My Affidavit: Furthermore, the Defendant has brought a Restraining Order against me wherein it states 
I am not entitled to overnight visitation with my children while residing with my fiance. However, the 
Defendant does not enforce her Restraining Order in that she has been allowing the children to stay with 
me at nights at her convenience and according to her whim. For the reason that she fails to abide by the 
rules as outlined in the Restraining Order, it should be removed. 
Her Affidavit: In response to paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Affidavit, I have abandoned the restraining 
order restraining Plaintifffrom overnight visitation with the children and Plaintiff has normal 
weekend visitation without restriction. 
17. Again, the only times she has allowed me to have the children overnight is when she has wanted 
to stay overnight in Layton at her boyfriend or when she just spent thousands of dollars on getting her 
breasts enlarged and needed to recover. The last two weekend periods, she has let me take the kids and it 
appears that she has abandoned the order, but isn't she making herself out to be the judge in this matter? 
Doesn't the Court need to remove this restraining order? This is just another perfect indication that she 
feels that she is above the law and can do anything she wants to do. 
Pam has lied throughout her Affidavit and I believe that she and Sharon have committed perjury 
throughout it to discredit me with the Court. They are slandering me with allegations that are not only 
unproven, but have been proven to be to the contrary through evidence and testimony submitted to the 
court. Furthermore, this new contempt action is just another harassment by Pam to punish me for not 
being able to earn the income she wants me to have. When I asked Pam on Tuesday, June 28th, why she's 
seeking to put me in jail again for 30 days, that it will cost me my job that I've worked so hard at learning 
(Dee will hire someone else to work with him on the carpet jobs and I'll lose mine) and that will provide a 
steady income for me to be able to pay her and I won't receive any income for that whole month, her 
response was, "maybe you just need to learn to find a better paying job that will give me the $2,000 per 
month that you're supposed to pay." 
Also, Jason (my 14 year old son) has told me that Pam's been cutting me down to him a lot lately 
concerning the money that I'm trying to reduce for support of the five children. She's told him that 
I'm lazy and just trying to get out of paying for them. Jason said he'd testify to this if we want him 
to. 
For some reason, Pam is taking the $241 amount and trying to make it look to the Court that that's the 
amount I'm trying to get the reduction to. When she states in her other papers that I'm trying to reduce 
the support for each kid down to $48 per month, she's basing it on the $241, not the $349. Regardless, 
that's the amount I should pay based on my income and I just want to get it in line with what I can pay so 
I can get out of this hole. 
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ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924901543 
Judge William B. Bohling 
-oOo-
Plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce and 
Defendant's Motion for Contempt and Other Related Matters came on 
regularly for trial on October 4, 1994, before the Honorable John 
A. Rokich, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and by and through his attorney, B. Ray Zoll, 
and Defendant appearing in person and by and through her attorney, 
Sharon A. Donovan, and the Court having heard testimony of the 
parties and thereafter the Court having discussed this matter with 
counsel and the parties, and thereafter, the parties having entered 
into a Stipulation in this matter to resolve the issues herein, and 
said Stipulation having been read into the record in the presence 
of both parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Court approves the parties' stipulation. 
2- The Decree of Divorce entered on August 13, 1992, and as 
further modified by the Court on August 17, 1993, is further 
modified as follows: 
A. Support. Based upon imputed income to 
Plaintiff of $3,000.00 gross income per month, and an 
imputed gross income to Defendant of $1,200.00 per month, 
child support shall be based upon the Child Support 
Guidelines in the amount of $881.82 per month, and the 
sum of $500.00 per month, as and for alimony, for a total 
support obligation of $1,381.82 per month. This support 
shall commence with the month of October, 1994, and shall 
be paid one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th days 
of each month thereafter, until the children reach their 
age of majority, or graduate from high school in their 
expected senior year. 
The parties shall exchange tax returns by May 15th 
of each year, commencing with May 15, 1995. It is the 
Court's intention that there be no decrease in support, 
based upon the May 15, 1995, tax returns and possibly an 
increase in support at that time. Either party, based 
upon the tax information may petition the Court for a 
review of the support. 
B. Contempt. The issue of contempt shall be 
reserved, pending compliance by Defendant. 
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C. Judgment. Defendant shall be granted a 
judgment against Plaintiff in the sum of $20,413.70, 
which represents any and all arrearages owed to Defendant 
through October 4, 1994. Subject to the Court's input, 
the parties have agreed that there be a one-year grace 
period, until October 4, 1995, before Defendant can 
execute on this judgment, provided Plaintiff remains 
current on his support obligations. If he does not 
remain current on payments, Defendant may execute on the 
judgment, together with the judgment interest rate of 
5.72%. 
D. Minimum Payment. After the one-year grace 
period, to-wit: commencing with October 4, 1995, 
Plaintiff shall make a minimum payment of $100.00 per 
month on the arrearages, in addition to his support in 
the amount of $1,381.82 per month. If Defendant 
remarries and the alimony terminates, Defendant agrees to 
pay at least $500.00 per month on the arrearages, until 
the arrearages, plus interest, are paid in full. 
E. Life Insurance. Plaintiff shall obtain a term 
life insurance policy in the sum of $50,000.00 on his 
life, with the children named as the sole and exclusive 
beneficiaries thereon. This life insurance policy will 
be obtained within thirty days of October 4, 1994, to-
wit: November 5, 1994, and Plaintiff shall notify 
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Defendant when the policy is in place, together with the 
policy number and Plaintiff shall supply verification of 
the insurance upon request. 
F. Medical Insurance. Plaintiff shall obtain 
medical insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor 
children, and the new Child Support Guidelines effective 
July 1, 1994, shall apply, which requires the parties to 
share equally the premiums for the health insurance 
related to the children and shall equally all non-covered 
medical and dental expenses, until the children reach the 
age of majority. 
G. Attorney's Fees. Each party shall pay their 
own attorney's fees. 
H. Medical Debts. The parties agree that 
Plaintiff owes one-half of medical bills totalling 
$480.50, or $240.25. 
In addition, Defendant has paid some bills for which 
Plaintiff owes one-half. The total amount that Plaintiff 
owes to Defendant for those bills is $185.35, and 
judgment shall enter against Plaintiff in that amount. 
Said amount shall be paid to Defendant within thirty days 
from October 4, 1994, to-wit: November 4, 1994. 
In addition, there is an outstanding medical bill 
relative to an accident at school, and after Defendant 
pursues an insurance claim through the school, if there 
4 
is any remaining balance, the parties shall share the 
balance equally. 
DATED this 2£> day of 
BY THE COURT :\J ^-s*~. 
District Court Judge T 
Approved as to form: 
B. RAY ZOLL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the rUy "^~ day of December, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
B. Ray Zoll, Esq. 
Zoll & Branch 
5300 South 360 West 
Third Floor, Suite 360 





B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 262-1500 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





| OBJECTION TO ORDER 
> MODIFYING DECREE OF 
) DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924901543 
Judge William B. Bohling 
COMES now the Plaintiff
 f by and through his counsel of 
record, B. Ray Zoll, and hereby submits his Objection to the 
proposed Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, as follows: 
1. Under Paragraph A. Support, the language should be 
as follows [revisions are underlined]: 
The parties shall exchange tax returns by May 15th of 
each year, commencing with May 15, 1995. It is the 
Court's intention that there be possibly an increase or 
decrease in support at that time, based on the 1994 tax 
returns. Either party, based upon the tax information 
1 
; i ~ — ' X 
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LA/V 
may petition the Court for a review of the support. 
2. Under Paragraph B. Contempt, the language should be 
as follows [revisions are underlined]: 
The issue of contempt shall be dismissed. 
3. Under Paragraph D. Minimum Payment, the language 
should be as follows [revisions are underlined]: 
After the one-year grace period, to-wit: commencing with 
October 4, 1995, Plaintiff shall make a minimum payment 
of $100.00 per month on the arrearages, in addition to 
his support in the amount of support determined by the 
Court at that time. If Defendant remarries and the 
alimony terminates, Defendant agrees to pay at least 
$500.00 per month on the arrearages, until the arrearages, 
plus interest, are paid in full. 
4. Under Paragraph F. Medical Insurance, the language 
should be as follows [revisions are underlined]: 
Plaintiff has obtained medical insurance coverage for 
the benefit of the minor children, and the new Child Support 
Guidelines effective July 1, 1994, shall apply, which 
requires the parties to share equally the premiums for 
the health insurance related to the children and shall 
share equally all non-covered medical expenses, until the 
children reach the age of majority. 
2 
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Order be revised 
accordingly, in order to reflect the above corrections. 
DATED this \j day of February, 1995. 
. Z0L 
Attorney! for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on this / 7 day of 
February, 1995, to the following: 
Sharon A. Donovan 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
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August 2, 1995 
Douglas Castleton 
7342 South Launa Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Re: Delinquent Account 
Dear Doug: 
Please find enclosed ,a copy of your latest billing statement, 
In reviewing your file, I have discovered that you are delinquent: 
in the payment of your legal bill, I will accept a 15% reduction 
in the amount of your bill if it is paid in cash within two (2) 
weeks from the date hereof. In any event, if you do not make 
arrangements with our office to begin payment on your bill within 
two (2) weeks from the date hereof, I will have no other option 
but to withdraw as your counsel in the matters for which this lav; 
firm has represented you, and to pursue collection of this amount 
from you. 
I am cutting back on my case load in order to be able to 
spend more time with my family, and in order to provide more 
effective services to my clients. If you determine to retain the 
services of alternative counsel, I will support you and your new 
lawyer in the transition of your case. I do hope we can remain 
friends, and I wish you the best of continued success. 
If you wish to make arrangements with our office to begin 
pr-yment en your legal bill, in order to continue receiving my 
services as your attorney, please contact my office immediately. 
Very truLy^v^urs i/^~) 
TabK 
Zoll & Branch 
Attorneys at Law 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City UT 84123 
Statement Submitted To: 
Douglas Castleton 
c/o Abaco Installers LLC 
P. 0. Box 17612 
Salt Lake City UT 84117-0612 
II EXHIBIT 3A J 
April 1, 1996 
Reference #22397 
Professional services 
03/21/96 Runner fees to pick up books. 
For professional services rendered 
Additional charges: 









Interest on overdue balance 






Douglas Castleton Page 2 
Amount 
Balance due $4,739.78 
LAW OFFICES O S 
Z O I X & B R A N C H 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
5 3 0 0 SoyVH 3 6 0 W E S T 
THiRfe FLOOR. S U I T E 3 6 0 
£kLT LAKE CITY. U T A H 8 4 1 2 3 
Address Correction Requested 
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April 9, 1996 
TOi DOUGLAS CASTLETON 
F0 BOX 17612 
SLC, DT 84117-0612 
FROMI B. RAY ZOLL 
KQTICK OF TKRMIHATIOH 
Notice is hereby given to Douglas Castleton and its 
subsidiaries or affiliates from Nathan Ricks of NS Group that you 
are hereby terminated from any consulting or independent contractor 
relationship between you and NS Group its subsidiaries or 
affiliates. 
This notice is given for cause as described in the meeting at 
the offices of Zoll and Branch acting as attorneys for Nathan Ricks 
and NS Group whereon a variety of improprieties have occurred by 
you* 
This termination is effective immediately and you are hereby 
directed to cease and desist from using any of the NS Group 
proprietary trademarks, copyrights, training manuals, slides, 
promotional materials, lists of names of distributors, vendors or 
customers which are all property rights of NS Group. Further you 
are directed to disassociate yourself and your related entitles 
with any vendors utilized in your capacity as an independent 
consultant with NS Group. 
Pursuant to our understanding and as you have consented we 
have picked up and caused to be delivered to the NS Group offices 
certain equipment, files, software, furnishings and the like from 
your apartment to be held by NS Group offices pending our further 
investigation of the amount of money that has been inappropriately 
obtained by you. Upon a complete accounting being made it is the 
position of NS Group that you will provide restitution for said 
monies and you have allowed NS Group to set off any unpaid money 
due the NS Group against the present fair market value of the 
equipment that has been consensually seized and is being held as 
B
°?2rity for this repayment. It is further understood that funds 
paid by NS Group have been used to purchase certain equipment which 
»«8s the equipment rightfully owned by NS Group and which will be 
more fully accounted for shortly. 
We request that you stay in communication with us on a daily 
basis until we determine the accounting and decide what other legal 
course of action may be taken* 
Please feel free to contact me at the above entitled office. 
Very trulvypurs. 
BRZ/acf 
ccs Nathan Ricks 
TabM 
AgpgKPusirr 
Comes now the parties, Doug Castleton, hereafter referred to 
as "Castleton*' and KS Group and its related parties, hereinafter 
referred to as "N.S." and hereby enter into this Agreement 
partially to satisfy a present dispute between them* This 
Settlement Agreement is based upon the following facts x 
1. Castleton has provided at the request of NS Group certain 
services involving production of materials, tapes, videos, manuals 
for the NuSkin business and downline of N.S* Network as an 
independent contractor. 
2. N.S. was satisfied with the services and product provided 
by Castleton until it was discovered that Castleton had created 
false and fictitious invoices delivered to N.S. to pay monies not 
lawfully due N.S. and did in fact obtain money from N.S. under 
those false pretenses for more than was actually due and payable to 
actual vendors. 
3. Castleton admits he owes for said made up invoices. 
I * PLAINTIFF'S 1 
11 EXHIBIT I 
If 5b I 
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4* NS Group desires to have additional time to do discovery 
and account for the obligation owed to N.S* and this Agreement has 
no effect whatsoever on that claim. 
5, Certain property equipment is being held by N.S. Group 
and/or its bailee Nathan Ricks to secure claims of N.S* Group 
against Caatleton. Said property was consensually given to Ricks 
for security purposes and is being held by agreement pending 
execution of this Agreement:. The parties further agree as follows: 
A. Upon execution of this Agreement the following 
equipment will be returned to Castleton: 
0 K /' 
3. 
4. 
B. The following equipment shall continue to be 
retained by Ricks: 
1. >JP< !-U—<> GHC~.&UJ ^ \ ^ 






C. Castleton does hereby release, hold harmless and 
indemnify N.S. and Nathan Ricks from any and all claims that 
may be asserted against N.S. or Nathan Ricks resulting from 
his work relationship with N.S. and Nathan Ricks or from the 
consensual possession of the property described herein. 
D. Castleton accepts the termination of relationship as 
reflected in the termination letter dated the ^ ^ day of 
Aft"- ^  1996. 
B. Any violation or breach of this Agreement subjects 
the breaching party to payment of all damages, reasonable 
attorney fees and costs associated with enforcement of this 
Agreement. 
6. RIGHTS IN RESULTS OF SERVICES, Castleton acknowledges 
and agrees that the results of any services rendered by him or 
others under his direction under the proper jeapiflsaast: of N.S. is 
exclusive, confidential and proprietary information and property of 
N,S« Group and is not to be disclosed to any person or entity other 
than N*S., except with H.S-'s prior written consent. 
7, INVENTIONS. Castleton acknowledges and agrees that all 
ideas, discoveries, developments, lists, suggestions, procedures, 
relationships, and inventions (collectively, the "Inventions") 
which he conceived or reduced to practice during the course of, or 
as a result of, any services shall be the exclusive property of 
N.S. and should be promptly communicated to U.S. In writing* 
During the period of this Agreement and thereafter at any 
reasonable time when called upon to do sobyN.s.f Castleton agrees 
to execute applications for domestic or foreign letters patent, 
copyrights (both state and federal), assignments and such other 
documents and instruments and to perform such other acts, which 
N.S. reasonably requests
 r in order to secure to N*S* full 
protection and ownership of the rights in and to the inventions 
and/or in connection with the preparation, filing and prosecution 
of applications for letters patent or copyrights for the 
inventions, N.S. agrees to bear all expenses in connection with 
preparation, filing and prosecution of applications or letters 
patent or copyrights and for all matters provided in this Paragraph 
requiring the time and/or assistance of Castleton after termination 
4 
of this Agreement* 
8* CONFIDKHTIAL INFORMATION, Castleton acknowledges that 
any and all information of any nature which has been or may be 
disclosed or discovered either directly or indirectly to Castleton 
by N,S. or any of its affiliates is confidential, proprietary and 
secret in nature and Castleton agrees# without limitation, to 
maintain the confidential, proprietary and secret character 
thereof. Upon request of N.S., termination,, or expiration of this 
Agreement/ Castleton will surrender or caused to be surrendered to 
M.S. all lists and other written information received by or 
discovered by Castleton or prepared in connection with this 
Agreement or the performance of any services pursuant to employment 
related to this Agreement, as well as all other property belonging 
to N*S- The obligations of Castleton under this paragraph shall 
survive the termination or expiration n TJITJJXLI nywrfr for a period of 
five (5) years* 
9. COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. Castleton will not directly or 
indirectly own, manage, operate, join, control or participate in 
the ownership, management, operation or control of, or be employed 
or otherwise connected in any manner with any business which at 
anytime during such period directly or indirectly competes with 
N.S. in the trade areg^ which is worldwidef for a period of five (5) 
years subsequent to the date on which his employment by N.S. 
terminates for any reason, CtW*Tf,K* ** 
10. Castleton shall not compete either directly or indirectly 
in any service or function that is similar in nature to N.S.'s 
services which includes but is not limited to development of 
training materials, audio and video tapes related to the businessr 
promotion and training efforts and materials, FAX on demand, 
satellite, voice-mail, and all other related functions in the 
NuSkin/IDN/University businesses- Furthermore, Castleton, after 
termination shall agree not to use the cont acts he has made while 
employed with N-S« in any way for his own benefit or business* 
11. HO OTHER AGREEMENT. Castleton represents that he is not 
a party to any other agreement which would prevent him from 
entering into this Agreement or which would adversely affect this 
Agreement or the performance of any services hereunder in any 
manner* 
12. ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS. Castleton agrees that a 
violation on his port of any covenant contained in this Agreement 
will cause such damage to N-S. as will be irreparable and for that 
6 
reason, Castleton further agrees that N.S. shall be entitled as a 
matter of right, to an injunction out of any court of competent 
jurisdiction, restraining any further violation of said covenants 
by Castleton/ his employees, partners, or agents• Such right to 
injunction shall be cumulative and in addition to whatever other 
remedies H.S* may have including, specifically, recovery of 
damages. Castleton expressly acknowledges and agrees that the 
respective covenants and agreements shall be construed in such a 
manner as to be enforceable under applicable laws if a more limited 
scope of time is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to 
be required. 
13• NOTICES. Notices, demands, payments, reports and 
correspondence shall be addressed to the parties hereto at the 
address or such parties set forth below or to such other places 
which may from time to time be designated in writing to the other 
party. Notices hereunder shall be effective upon personal delivery 
or two days following deposit in the United States mail, postage 
pre-paid. 
If to Castleton, to: / 0 <*** /?Q/J- *~ 
7 
If to N.S., tos 
With a copy toi 
DKEED this / ? day of A*< ./ 1996. 
K.S• Group 
BY: 
ITS t y<uA->>*^\. 
.-? 
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DOTG^STLETON, INDIVIDUALLY 
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